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INTRODUCTION
Tarzan, Betty Boop, Sam Spade, Scarlett O’Hara, James Bond,
Harry Potter, Holden Caulfield, Sherlock Holmes: the mere names of
these once-litigated figures evoke the market power and popular
significance characters can possess. Characters are “cultural heuristics,”
with the power to transport, amaze, horrify, and inspire. 1 Once readers
come to know a character, they may want to spend time with her again
and again. The experience of reading about a character may deliver
many of the same sensations and emotions as a social interaction with
her in a reader’s real life would do. 2 Narrative fiction has a unique
ability to provide a set of simulated experiences for a reader to live out
in her mind. 3 It is perhaps this signature feature that can make reading
so intensely emotionally engaging.
Characters are central to that experience of engagement, for
reasons that are not entirely understood. Readers can know a character
even more profoundly than they can know a human being, perhaps
because of narrative techniques that invite readers into characters’ inner
lives. 4 Readers become deeply attached to “their” characters. In the
words of one literary theorist, “[e]ven though readers know perfectly
well that fictional characters are make-believe, they go on caring about
them, lending them the bodies that they do not possess, feeling with
them in emotional fusion that paradoxically calls into embodiment a
psychic corporeality vouched for in readers’ own bodily responses.” 5
It is not uncommon to hear readers complain that when a book
ended, they were sorry to part with its characters, as though they had
BLAKEY VERMEULE, WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT LITERARY CHARACTERS? 52 (2009).
Annie Murphy Paul, Your Brain on Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at SR6.
3 Id. (“Fiction—with its redolent details, imaginative metaphors and attentive descriptions
of people and their actions—offers an especially rich replica. Indeed, in one respect novels go
beyond simulating reality to give readers an experience unavailable off the page: the
opportunity to enter fully into other people’s thoughts and feelings.”).
4 Rita Felski, Introduction, 42 NEW LITERARY HIST. v, v–vi (2011) (“[V]ia the specifics of [a
character’s] formal shaping, it offers otherwise unattainable insights into the historical
inflection of personhood.”).
5 Suzanne Keen, Readers’ Temperaments and Fictional Character, 42 NEW LITERARY HIST.
295, 309 (2011).
1
2
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literally spent time with them as actual persons. As a function of that
sense of connection, readers may compare themselves to a favorite
character, emulate or critique her, empathize with her, or imagine her in
new settings or stories. 6 Readers who are also authors may subsequently
struggle to situate a favorite character in their own works of fiction,
perhaps in tribute or perhaps in defiance. 7 In these ways, characters
seem to exist autonomously, that is, apart from their original works and
authors. Characters could be said to run—as a neuroscientist described
the process of reading—“on minds of readers just as computer
simulations run on computers.” 8 In a fundamental way, then, characters
lead independent lives in their readers’ imaginations, in subsequent
works of literature, and in the public sphere. 9 That a personality may be
termed a Lothario, a Don Juan, or a Casanova attests to how fictitious
characters can be so memorable and enduring—perhaps notorious, in
these examples—that they become archetypes that circulate almost
autonomously in the cultural economy.
Paradoxically, it may be this very autonomy that makes characters
valuable to their creators as commodities in their own right, apart from
the original works in which they appear. 10 For authors, characters may
be the most valuable aspects of an artistic work whose financial success
is difficult to predict and may be fleeting. 11 Creating enduring characters
Id. at 306.
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural
Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 601–12 (2007) (describing
and defending defiant uses); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a
New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655–60 (1997) (describing, generally, fan
uses as tribute and critique).
8 Paul, supra note 2.
9 Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating A Legal Space for
Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 905 (2007)
(“[L]iterary characters . . . exist within the narrative as the focal point for human identification.
In the present cultural milieu, today’s readers, as tomorrow’s writers, are twisting and
refashioning iconic literary characters to reflect their own insights and identities.”).
10 Leon Kellman, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 25 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 3 (1958)
(proclaiming that “[t]he fictional character today is perhaps the most important commodity in
the entire field of entertainment in the United States.”). If this was true in 1958 at the time of
this Article’s publication, it is even truer today. Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of
the Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in American Mass Media, 23 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 301, 302 (2003). Characters generate billions of dollars in revenue annually for
intellectual property owners. Melanie Warner, How a Meek Comic Book Company Became a
Hollywood Superpower, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at C7; see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note,
When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to
Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992).
11 It would be more appropriate, of course, to refer to owners as well as (or instead of)
authors, given the way copyright law structures its entitlements. However, this Article is
concerned with the incentive effects on authors of protecting their characters, and the impact of
such protection on subsequent authors. The Article thus uses “authors” in lieu of “owners” in
most circumstances. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 216 F.2d 945, 949
(1954) (finding that authors reused characters in order to generate readerly momentum (or
“snowball”) in the reception for their works); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of
6
7
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increases the likelihood that audiences will buy subsequent works.
Subsequent works in which characters star may change, but the
characters themselves often remain effectively the same. Characters’
value to authors derives in substantial part from their capacity for
potential perpetual reuse in new works. 12 Yet their value to the reading
public and to subsequent authors derives in large part from their ability
to live multiple lives beyond the limited horizons of their original
authors. Characters are, in a sense, unique among components of an
artistic work because they can be removed from the work for the
purposes of starring in other works. 13 This may be the major reason that
characters become the subject of copyright litigation: they appear to be
leading lives in works beyond their original ones. 14 Yet it is arguably the
very ability of characters to lead lives separate from their original works
that makes them such a valuable form of legally cognizable property,
thus ironically threatening their independent legal existence as cultural
signifiers. The law reflects this tension between characters as freely
circulating cultural signifiers, and characters as legal property whose
circulation is subject to their owners’ granting permission.
Unfortunately, while copyright law plays an important role in
allocating rights to the use of characters, the law in this area is very
unclear. Character jurisprudence is thought to be muddled and
“quixotic”; neither “predictable nor fair.” 15 Courts have been vague or
Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429, 432 (“Characters such as Sherlock Holmes, Tarzan,
Falstaff, Superman, James Bond, Pogo, Peter Rabbit, the Bobbsey Twins, Nancy Drew, Travis
McGee, and Mickey Mouse may be better known and more valuable than any particular work
in which they appear.”).
12 Goldberger, supra note 10, at 302 (“Although other aspects of a work can be reused to
create new works, it is the character that is most portable and most profitable. Characters such
as James Bond, Hercule Poirot, and even Bart Simpson transcend any one work in which they
appear. The thing that makes them so valuable is that they can appear over and over again in a
variety of media. With these brand name characters, the ability to use them in derivative works
is even more valuable than the right to sell any one particular work.”).
13 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.11.3, at 158 (1989)
(“Unlike most paintings, photographs or novelty items, a character can take on a life of its own
and thus may be protected against copies in postures, settings and attitudes far removed from
any in the author’s original depiction.”).
14 Sometimes owners litigate characters because subsequent authors’ characters are
substantially similar, though not identical, to the original characters. But this typically happens
when an entire work’s ideas and structure are at issue. The situation in which independent
character protection is at issue is when the characters alone have been borrowed and
repurposed.
15 See, e.g., E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection of Characters—Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 77, 87 (1974); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 437 n.49; Leonard Zissu,
Whither Character Rights: Some Observations, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 121 (1981); Kathryn M.
Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide,
41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 926 (2009) (“[C]opyright protection for fictional characters
[is] . . . riddled with uncertainty and inconsistency as courts have struggled to fit fictional
characters into the rubric of copyright law.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 651 (describing how
doctrinal confusion undermines the policy goals of copyright law). The case law’s problems
receive fuller treatment infra Parts II, III.
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mistaken in their decisions to adopt certain thresholds for character
protect-ability, and conclusory in their determinations that characters
are—or are not—copyrightable. 16 Judgments often seem to reflect realworld factors or legal areas other than copyright, yet legal reasoning
takes place on the terrain of copyright as though faithful to the law, thus
entrenching the doctrinal confusion.
Beyond the confusion internal to copyright’s protection of
characters, a further source of confusion lies at the boundary between
copyright and trademark, where sometimes character owners make
claims for overlapping protection. 17 Litigants typically bring claims
under both sets of laws, whether or not the claims are equally
meritorious. Trademark law extends to some characters, and though its
protection is narrower in scope and more expensive, it is an important
source of legal protection for characters, substantial enough doctrinally
and economically to justify a fuller discussion elsewhere. By contrast,
copyright protection benefits owners by being broad in scope, by arising
automatically upon the character’s fixation in a work of art that qualifies
for copyright protection, and by being comparatively inexpensive.18
Many character cases feature both kinds of claims, and because courts
have not historically paid enough attention to the differences between
the two intellectual property regimes, 19 the case law has evolved in a
doctrinally haphazard fashion.
Although the problem of proper channeling, or the improper
convergence of forms of intellectual property protection, is a serious
issue muddying the doctrinal waters around characters, this Article
focuses on problems arising internally within copyright protection
alone. It does so in order to address fundamental antecedent questions
of the nature of characters and the relationship between characters and
their works. It also argues that a better understanding of the purpose
and flaws in copyright protection for characters could help disentangle
copyright from trademark, thus alleviating some of the tensions in the
jurisprudence of both areas of intellectual property law.
Towards that end, this Article argues for the benefits of an
interdisciplinary approach to the problem of copyright’s internal
See, e.g., Brylawski, supra note 15, at 87; Foley, supra note 15, at 921.
In fact, characters can be protected under copyright law, trademark law, state law
misappropriation law, unfair practices and deception law, and, in some cases, the right of
publicity. In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the court held that a book’s contents
could merit both copyright and trademark protection. 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(reasoning that “[b]ecause the nature of the property right conferred by copyright is
significantly different from that of trademark, trademark protection should be able to co-exist,
and possibly to overlap, with copyright protection”); Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus:
Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 433
(1994); see also Foley, supra note 15, at 953–57; Helfand, supra note 10, at 651.
18 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 439–40.
19 Foley, supra note 15, at 964; Helfand, supra note 10, at 651.
16
17
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inconsistencies. Character jurisprudence under copyright law misaligns
with cultural and literary conceptions of character. Intellectual property
law has taken insufficient account of important discrepancies among
legal, cultural, and literary theories of character. Literature helps
articulate what is at work in the doctrinal tensions in copyright’s
character jurisprudence over which kind of character, if any, to protect
independently, and how much of it, if any, to protect separately from the
text. At the heart of the doctrinal confusion over the proper scope of
protection for characters are a series of questions that literature can help
answer: what is a character, and how can the law identify it as such? Can
characters truly be protected independently of the work that embeds
them, and if so, how much of the character should the law protect as
such? What method should courts use to separate characters from their
texts, for the purposes of assessing whether unauthorized uses of
characters in new creative works constitute infringement? To whom do
characters belong, and when? What should the law make of the role
readers play in constructing, completing, and resuscitating characters?
As the confused case law makes plain, the law does not have good tools
to answer these questions, even though the factual scenarios at stake in
litigation continue to press courts for solutions.
The turn to literature yields insights into the proper scope not just
of character protection, but also more broadly of the derivative work
right, which scholars have cited as an important area for copyright
reform. 20 In clarifying the law’s doctrinal confusion, literary
considerations can provide one piece in the larger puzzle of copyright
reform. Ultimately, they can also help inform the inquiry into whether
copyright or trademark, or neither, is proper for character protection.
Part I sets out the purpose and evolution of protection for fictional
characters under copyright law. 21 It describes the dominant tests used to
20 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 551, 564 n.88 (calling for the clarification of the derivative work right); Tushnet, supra
note 7, at 651.
21 This Article excludes from consideration protection for human characters, to which
other forms of law such as the right of publicity, may attach. Fictional literature is not directly
concerned with human characters, and this Article concerns itself with fictional characters. See
Gregory Currie, Narrative and the Psychology of Character, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM
61, 61 (2009) (bracketing human characters who appear in fiction so as to focus productively on
fictional characters’ role in narrative); Zissu, supra note 15, at 121 (“The historical or actual
figure, living or dead, is not the subject of our inquiry. Such figures are not fictional even when
presented fictitiously in the sense that the author gave unduly free rein to his imagination
instead of adhering to facts.”). For consideration of the intellectual property concerns involved
with human characters, see, e.g., Leslie A. Kurtz, Digital Actors and Copyright—From The Polar
Express to Simone, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 783, 785 (2006) (exploring
answers to the questions: “What is the legal status of . . . electronic actors . . . digital human
actors? Unlike traditional cartoon characters, like Mickey Mouse, they are derived in some
fashion from human beings. But they are created, in large part, by those employing digital
technology. Who owns legal rights to these hybrid creations?”); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional
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determine whether characters will be independently protected, and
discusses the confusion that has arisen in the law. Part II addresses the
proper scope of protection for characters by broadly tracing the
evolution of characters through literary history. Literary history,
theories, and texts demonstrate that the very factors that gave rise to
characters’ centrality to modern literature may be the factors that make
protecting them independently under copyright unworkable. After
providing this literary background, Part II frames what the Article terms
the “entanglement” problem. Starting in the eighteenth century,
characters began to become more important, for readers and for
markets. 22 As characters rose in importance, I argue, they also became
harder to extricate from their texts, for the purposes of treating them as
independent pieces of intangible property under copyright law. Their
disentanglement is a necessary, but inconsistent and often conclusory,
part of copyright analysis that invites too much manipulation of the
substantial similarity analysis. Part III argues that in spite of copyright’s
stated commitment to aesthetic neutrality, the law surrounding
characters is not neutral and will never be neutral. Copyright
encourages and rewards the creation of visually rendered (or visually
evocative) characters over literary (or purely verbal) ones. The law
encourages the creation of what literary theory terms “flat” rather than
“round” characters. Literary theory thus exposes the reductive nature of
the law’s treatment of characters, and its simplistic view of the proper
scope and implementation of independent copyright protection.
Literary theory also points to another legal problem regarding copyright
protection for characters: to the extent that readers play an important
role in receiving and construing characters, thus “mentally completing”
them, perhaps such characters cannot be seen to have satisfied
copyright’s fixation requirement. Recent case law exploring the fixation
requirement supports the idea that a work that undergoes constant
change after the artist has completed it may fail to clear the fixation
threshold. In the case of characters, the text in which the characters
appeared would receive protection, in its fixed textual form, and its
characters, as embedded in the work as mere collections of words,
would be protected as part of that text. But the particular role readers
play in adopting and engaging with and changing characters would
effectively bar protection for characters independently of their
originating texts. Thus, characters would no longer receive independent
copyright protection. Part IV concludes by turning to alternatives the

Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
355 (1998).
22 See, e.g., DEIDRE SHAUNA LYNCH, THE ECONOMY OF CHARACTER: NOVELS, MARKET
CULTURE, AND THE BUSINESS OF INNER MEANING (1998); VERMEULE, supra note 1.
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law might weigh in response to literature’s insights, and it provides a
brief overview of the possibilities in both copyright and trademark.
The Article concludes that copyright law would do well to take
account of the ways in which literary texts and theories reveal characters
to be much more complicated than copyright law currently
contemplates. Although literary insights into character do not
themselves require either expansion or contraction of protection—
dependent as reforms are on policy concerns endogenous to
copyright—they do fundamentally change the nature of the inquiry.
These insights expand the law’s understanding of characters and
highlight theoretical and doctrinal implications of the confusion
currently stymieing character protection under copyright law.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTS SOME CHARACTERS INDEPENDENTLY OF THEIR
WORKS
This Part provides background on the scope and nature of current
copyright protection for characters. It reframes the de facto purpose of
protection for independent characters as a gap-filling measure to be
used when regular substantial similarity tests between texts would fail to
produce an accurate result. It describes the two dominant tests for
character copyrightability, and argues that copyright law has set the
stage for a systematic aesthetic bias in favor of protecting certain kinds
of characters by relying on tests that are unclear, difficult to implement,
and blind to the role characters actually play in fiction and in literary
creation. Literature shows why copyright’s current analytic structure
with respect to characters is bound to remain flawed unless it changes.
A.

Copyright Protection for Characters

The 1976 Copyright Act (hereinafter the Act) grants authors of
“original works of authorship” 23 a bundle of rights in order to encourage
them to “create and disseminate original expression.” 24 Authors possess
the exclusive right to copy, perform, distribute or display their works,
and to create what the law terms “derivative works.” 25 Derivative works
are subsequent works of authorship that are based on preexisting
works26 or that incorporate characters or component parts from
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285
(1996).
25 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
26 Id. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
23
24
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preexisting works. 27 Thus, parties may infringe the rights of original
authors in their copyrighted works in a number of ways: by
reproducing, displaying or performing the works verbatim, or
distributing them without authorization. When character details in a
story are borrowed verbatim as part of the unauthorized copying or
distribution of the entire and exact preexisting work, courts do not need
to reach the question of whether the characters are independently
copyrightable. 28 This is because a subsequent work that is “substantially
similar” to a preexisting work will be found to be infringing unless a
successful defense is available. 29
By contrast, when character details from one work are used in the
creation of an otherwise new work—such as an unauthorized sequel or
spinoff—the allegedly infringing work would fail the substantial
similarity test for purposes of proving copying because the old and new
works would look too dissimilar. It is typically then that courts tackle
the question of whether copyright subsists in the independent character,
and has been infringed. 30 The only common feature in the two works is
the character. The old character might be said to have taken on a life of
her own in a new work. 31 Copying characters can thus serve as the sole
basis of an infringement claim, regardless of whether anything else in an
allegedly infringing work is “substantially similar” to a preexisting work.
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work
of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”). Using intellectual property terms of art—such as
“original” and “derivative works”—unintentionally connotes subtle but unhelpful value
judgments about the works under discussion. Thus, whenever possible, this Article has adopted
the term “source work” or “preexisting work” where copyright law has tended to use “original
work” and “subsequent work” rather than “derivative work.”
27 King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding that
copyright protection extends to all copyrightable component parts of a work in which copyright
subsists).
28 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2] (2013)
(“Where there is literal similarity . . . it is not necessary to determine the level of abstraction at
which similarity ceases to consist of an ‘expression of ideas,’ because literal similarity by
definition is always a similarity as to the expression of ideas.” (footnote omitted)).
29 Defenses might include, inter alia, independent creation or fair use. The doctrine of
independent creation was summed up in Learned Hand’s classic formulation: “[I]f by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he
would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir. 1936); see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying the doctrine of fair use); Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (holding that fair use is an affirmative defense, thus
placing the burden of proof with the proponent); 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:49 (4th ed. 2002) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense.”).
30 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12; see also Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1450
(1988) (reaching substantial similarity analysis with respect to characters after stating that there
was “little similarity” between the works at bar “in terms of overall plot, sequence, dialogue or
setting”).
31 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 432.
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For example, if Shakespeare’s works were protected by copyright,
an unauthorized “prequel” to Hamlet—in which he and Ophelia eloped
to the Danish countryside before the revenge tragedy ever ignited, for
instance—might contain a number of substantial similarities to the
underlying work. A court might find that some protectable aspects of
Shakespeare’s expression were taken, as well as some protectable plot
incidents. If, in a second hypothetical work based on Hamlet, Hamlet
and Ophelia were instead imagined as college freshmen in Elsinore,
Idaho, in a transposition of their thorny courtship into a setting and
time far removed from its original context, substantial similarity
analysis between this campus romance and the underlying play would
likely fail to find copying on the basis of the works’ structures and
settings. The two works would look too different from each other. 32
However, independent character protection under copyright might still
reach this subsequent work.
One way of viewing character protection then, is as a de facto gapfilling measure: courts use it to fill what they may perceive as a gap in
protection when subsequent uses of characters from preexisting
copyrighted works extend beyond the bounds of substantial similarity
analysis but a considerable use of preexisting materials has nonetheless
taken place. 33 In this hypothetical, a court would return to Hamlet to
assess, as always under copyright law, whether ownership of a valid
copyright exists and whether defendants copied plaintiffs’ work. 34 Direct
evidence of copying is rarely available, so plaintiffs may show (a) that
defendants had access to the copyrighted material from which they
allegedly copied and (b) that “substantial similarity” existed between
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ works. 35
A court that found no substantial similarity between the overall
works would then likely ask whether Hamlet and Ophelia were
copyrightable as independent characters, and if so, only then would ask
whether the subsequent work had impermissibly borrowed protected
parts of the underlying work’s characters. 36 The inquiry into character
copyrightability would begin, in most courts, with an examination of

32 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding no
infringement because “[t]he stories are quite different” from each other); accord Olson, 855
F.2d at 1450–51 (“The settings of the two works are too dissimilar to be relevant to the issue of
substantial similarity.”).
33 Plaintiffs must show that defendants copied “a substantial, legally protectable portion” of
plaintiff’s work. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1292
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
34 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
35 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162–63
(9th Cir. 1977).
36 Olson, 855 F.2d at 1451.
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“the degree to which the character is developed.” 37 The analysis would
consider the characters’ physical descriptions, linguistic tendencies or
catchphrases, relationships with other characters, and emotional traits. 38
For example, does the western mountain Ophelia sing songs about
“herbs” (or their modern-day pharmacological equivalent)? Does the
contemporary Hamlet act moody, melancholic, and indecisive? Does he
quote from or “remix” lines from the pre-existing Hamlet’s soliloquies?
The examples given above differ from the standard infringement
case, in that they both borrow a recognizable element from an
underlying work, to do something creative with it. Put otherwise, the
hypothetical unauthorized prequel and college love story imagined
above both differ in an important way from an infringing use that
merely copied parts or all of Shakespeare’s work verbatim, to avoid
working up something fresh. Scholarship has called for a clearer
distinction between these two kinds of infringement: copying and
creative reuse. 39 This Article adopts the distinction between copying and
creative reuse, and concerns itself with the second kind of infringement
alone: reuse of characters through the creation of original derivative
works, which is important in its own right 40 and can usually be
distinguished from mere copying quite easily. 41
Creative reuse plays a much more important role in character
jurisprudence than mere copying, which makes sense as a logical
proposition. If a second author simply copies a work outright, he will
have copied characters along with the rest of the work’s defining
features. If a second author seeks to build something fresh using the
37 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 443 F. Supp. 291, 301
(1977).
38 Note that the lack of clarity about precisely which aspects to include for the purposes of
substantial similarity analysis is part of the doctrinal confusion, as discussed fully, infra Part II.
39 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2538, 2557
(2009) (recognizing that some “iterative copying” may be fair use but highlighting that such
cases differ from regular copying because of their “orthogonal,” “speech-related purposes,” and
arguing that fair use determinations ought to be built on such distinctions through the ex ante
creation of “policy-relevant clusters”); Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason,
7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 323 (2009) (arguing that a distinction should be
drawn between the verbatim copying and distribution of preexisting works, and the creation of
derivative works based on those preexisting works); cf. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 25 (1967) (“It may be objected that Romantic literary ideas have little
relevance to the class of pedestrian, nonimaginative works which was the main subject of
copyright litigation. But this category cannot be marked off clearly from the other; and the
courts traditionally have not been careful to distinguish the various classes of works on
functional grounds.”).
40 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 473 (“Allowing authors to make productive use of an existing
character, for new artistic purposes, seems more important than allowing others to make copies
of a work.”).
41 Cf. id. (“[I]t is difficult to separate the hack’s piracy of another’s character, aimed at
nothing more than benefitting from the efforts of others, from the truly creative use of
character to produce a new effect.”).
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seeds of an earlier work, what he will frequently do is lift the characters
out of the first work and begin from that starting point. Setting aside
character licensing and termination of assignment cases, the typical
character infringement case focuses on creative reuse, rather than
copying, since that is the scenario in which independent protection
might conceivably exist. Note though, that the emphasis on characters’
independent copyrightability often bogs courts down in discussions of
the characters themselves, as opposed to the similarities between
characters, and the truly important inquiry: whether infringement has
occurred. 42 As a result, copyright protection for characters has
expanded; as Jessica Litman has written: “It used to be said that
characters were themselves uncopyrightable (and it was never really
true, but it was often said); today nobody would even say it.” 43
B.

Copyright’s Competing Purposes and Internal Limitations

Contemporary scholarship frames copyright’s purpose in largely
utilitarian terms. 44 The United States Constitution authorizes Congress
to pass copyright legislation to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” 45 The goal of such protection is thus forward-looking: it
purports to provide incentives for authors to create works of art they
might not create if they feared appropriation of those works for private
gain by others. 46 Anthony Trollope wrote, “Take away from English
authors their copyrights, and you would very soon take away from
England her authors.” 47 Trollope’s hyperbolic sentiment calls attention
to one of the central goals of copyright law: to provide incentives for
Id. at 440.
Litman, supra note 17, at 430 (footnotes omitted).
44 See Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 242 (1991). “[A] nod to
economic incentives is obligatory in contemporary copyright scholarship, and the assumptions
that underlie an incentive-based model have become part of the common language in which
copyright scholars speak.” Id. Though other theories justifying copyright exist, the utilitarian
theory predominates. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–12
(1982); cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (agreeing with the characterization of
copyright law’s purpose as a system that delivers “an incentive to create” by providing
“assurance of fair compensation for [artists] and their heirs”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.”).
47 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 439 n.62 (citing 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
142 (1883)).
42
43
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authors to create works. However, not all authors are treated equally
under copyright, which prioritizes authors under a kind of first-in-time
property rule. If authors use material from pre-existing works, copyright
law presumptively requires that they seek permission or be prepared to
offer fair use as an affirmative defense. 48
To counterbalance the preference for prior authors over
subsequent authors, copyright law limits authors’ rights in their works
with respect to both duration and subject matter. These restrictions
serve the public’s constitutional interests and offer some protections for
subsequent authors. The effective monopoly granted by copyright exists
only for a limited duration, after which all rights in the work revert to
the public, and the work falls into the public domain. 49 Inherent in
copyright’s system of incentives is that authors’ rights must to some
extent be weighed against subsequent authors’ rights. 50 In its seminal
creative fair use case, the Supreme Court referred to the balance of
authors and subsequent authors as an “inherent tension in the need
simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to
build upon it.” 51 Fair use exists to provide some “breathing space” for
authors who wish to build on preexisting building blocks in creating
their works of art. 52
Copyright protection for characters similarly contains several
internal limitations. These standards for legal protection may make
sense at a distance, but when examined up close, they reveal that
negotiating the contours of copyright protection in characters is a good
deal more difficult than lawmakers and authors might wish. 53 For
example, some uses of protected characters may qualify as “fair uses”
and some characters will simply fail to qualify for copyright protection
ab initio, perhaps because they are stock characters, uncopyrightable
ideas rather than copyrightable expression. 54 Congress built important
limitations into the subject matter of copyright in the form of the
48 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that authors presumptively have the broad exclusive right to create sequels).
49 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 7–
8 (2d ed. 1981). Determining length of duration can be a complex matter that can vary with the
work’s date of creation and publication, as well as its ownership, but the general rule currently
is that copyrighted works are subject to a term of protection for the life of the author plus
seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). This limited duration used to consist of fifty years, but
Congress extended copyright protection by twenty years with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 108, 203, 301–04) (hereinafter CTEA). The extension has been unsuccessfully challenged as
making copyright unconstitutionally long. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
50 Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
51 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
52 See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429
(2007).
53 See Kurtz, supra note 11, at 462; Foley, supra note 15, at 927.
54 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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idea/expression dichotomy and the related merger doctrine. Under the
idea/expression doctrine, copyright will not subsist in anything that is
merely an “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery.” 55 The Act limits protection to
expression of an idea; the underlying idea itself is excluded from
protection. 56 Relatedly, the scènes à faire doctrine stipulates that stock
characters, plot devices, and textual incidents may not be protected. 57
For example, characters that are mere types, such as the clown, the
Machiavel, the jealous husband, or the ingénue, will not be protected as
such. 58 The merger doctrine limits copyright’s scope still further: if a
particular work consists of expression that would otherwise be
protected, the merger doctrine prevents its copyrightability if the
expression is one of a very limited number of ways an idea may be
expressed. 59 By extension, then, if a character consists of an idea whose
expression is limited to one of very few possible modes of expression,
those forms of expression will not be protectable even if they do go
beyond being merely the stuff of “ideas.” A number of doctrines thus
impose natural limits on protection for characters: unless they go
beyond being mere stock characters, and can also survive review under
the merger doctrine, they do not merit protection. They fall outside the
statute’s scope because they are mere “ideas.” 60
Copyright’s scope and its purpose are meaningfully intertwined: to
the extent that Congress was willing to grant authors a monopoly
property right in the fruits of their labor, it did so only by attaching
numerous limitations. These limitations, from constitutional text
(“limited times”) to common law doctrines later codified (such as fair
use and the idea/expression dichotomy) are important for the
discussion of copyright in characters. Because characters live on beyond
their works, creating inspiration for subsequent readers and authors,
they give rise to what could be extraordinarily powerful rights with
substantial impact on parties other than owners. Copyright should
attend carefully to the proper scope of independent copyright protection
55 Id. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879) (holding that bookkeeping was a
“useful art” or idea protectable by patent, but not by copyright, protection under which was
limited to the expression of that idea).
56 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding that “[u]nlike a patent, a copyright
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea—not the idea itself”).
57 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Leslie A. Kurtz,
Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79 (1989).
58 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (“If a drunken old bum were a copyrightable character, so
would be a drunken suburban housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a
talking cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, [and] a masked
magician.”).
59 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58–59 (D. Mass. 1990).
60 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 650.
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for these fictional figures. In particular, the threshold for character
copyrightability is unclear, and benefits from sustained analysis.
C.

Tests for Character Copyrightability

Copyright protection for characters independent of the protection
for the works in which they appear arose at common law, with Judge
Learned Hand’s opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 61 The
Copyright Act does not categorically protect characters as independent
pieces of property the way it protects works such as literary works,
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes, choreographic works,
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures, sound
recordings, and architectural works. 62 Instead, characters were
historically protected as elements within a larger work. 63 Before Nichols,
it was assumed that characters received copyright protection as part of
the works in which they were embedded. 64 For example, if a first work
(say, Herman Melville’s Moby Dick) were copied in some respects by a
second work (say, Sena Jeter Naslund’s Ahab’s Wife, or The Star Gazer),
Melville might proceed against Naslund on the theory that her work
infringed the copyright in his work. The elements infringed upon would
be determined by the court’s substantial similarity analysis. In this
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
17 U.S.C. § 102.
63 The Copyright Act does not provide specific protection for characters as a category
independent of the works in which they appear. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, characters
were found protectable as component parts of copyrightable works in which they appeared.
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (referring to the protection
extended to “all the copyrightable parts of the work copyrighted”); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103; see
also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing § 3 of the
Copyright Act of 1909 and describing characters as “copyrightable component parts of the
work copyrighted”); Edmund Kitch, Comment on Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya
Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 41 (2006) (“The statute lists as
examples of the protected works of an author literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes, choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures,
sound recordings and architectural works. The statute explicitly excludes from protection any
‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principal, or discovery.’
Nothing about characters.” (footnotes omitted)).
64 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to the
characters, quite independently of the ‘plot’ proper, though, as far as we know such a case has
never arisen.”). Although cases had in fact touched on the copying of characters, none had
explored independent protection for characters. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns
Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding cartoon character “Wonderman” infringing
of “Superman” but assessing the similarities in terms of the characters and their surrounding
texts, rather than as independent characters); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1914) (finding a dramatic performance featuring the characters “Nutt” and “Giff” to
be infringing of a popular cartoon strip’s characters, “Mutt” and “Jeff,” but emphasizing the
similarities between the two works overall rather than the similarities between the characters
independently of their texts, and resting the bulk of its analysis on a market substitution
theory).
61
62
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instance, however, Naslund took less than a paragraph’s worth of
material directly from Melville’s work. 65 Unless this paragraph can
persuasively be claimed to comprise the heart of Melville’s work, it will
probably be insufficient to give rise to a finding of substantial
similarity. 66 Nichols clarified that characters could merit protection
independently of their works: here, Melville could sue even though
Ahab’s Wife is, as a work, dissimilar from Moby Dick, simply because
Naslund had used and repurposed a character, Una Spenser, from Moby
Dick.
Nichols created independent copyright for characters, but limited
the scope of such protection to exclude poorly developed characters.
Judge Hand held that to qualify for independent protection, characters
would need to be “distinctively delineated.” 67 The distinctive delineation
test set out in Nichols has become the de facto majority approach in
copyright’s character jurisprudence. For all the opinion’s importance,
however, Nichols has never been adopted so completely as to eliminate
other tests for character copyrightability. The main alternative
approach, laid out half a century ago by the Ninth Circuit, has been
critiqued possibly as roundly as the Nichols opinion has been praised. 68
In the “Sam Spade” case, the Ninth Circuit found that Dashiell
Hammett (and Knopf, his publisher) had not impliedly assigned away
rights to use of the famous detective he had created, Sam Spade. 69 In
allowing Hammett to continue to use his best-known character in
current and future works, the court rested mainly on contractual
grounds. 70 Yet like the Nichols court, it also took the opportunity to
reflect in dicta upon what sorts of works should give rise to independent
copyright protection for characters. 71 The court concluded that
characters could not be independently copyrighted unless “the character
Stacey D’Erasmo, Call Me Una, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at C7.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
67 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”).
68 On the view that the Sam Spade case got it wrong, see KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 n.44
(calling the case “wide of the present mark,” and calling “some of its observations on the
question of ‘characters’ . . . surely wrong”); see also Brylawski, supra note 15, at 87
(characterizing the analysis in the case as “productive of uncertainty and mischief,” and as an
“unintelligible verbal formula . . . the seed from which massive confusion has grown”). Indeed,
in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, the Court openly raises the critiques of its earlier case. 345
F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
69 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir.
1954).
70 Walt Disney, 345 F. Supp. at 111.
71 The court was unclear, later, whether the “constitutes the story being told test” was
properly part of its earlier holding, or only, as it stated, “arguably dicta.” Olson v. Nat’l Broad.
Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451–52 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoted in 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12 n.13.1).
The Air Pirates Court treated this standard for copyrightability as “an alternative rationale,”
suggesting greater power over the court than if it found the language to be dicta. 1 NIMMER,
supra note 28, § 2.12 n.13.1.
65
66
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really constitutes the story being told.” 72 Sam Spade and other
characters from The Maltese Falcon were merely “vehicles” through
which the story was conveyed; “if the character is only the chessman in
the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection
afforded by the copyright.” 73
Subsequent courts and commentators have claimed that the Sam
Spade case sets the bar for copyrightability so high that it effectively
denies any characters independent protection, 74 and the author of
perhaps the most highly respected copyright treatise calls the test “much
too restrictive.”75 At least one court cites it for the proposition that
“characters ordinarily may not be copyrighted.”76 Whether or not the
test makes sense on its own merits, it would seem to have been illapplied in the Sam Spade case, in which the court found that the
detective did not constitute the story being told. One observes a certain
irony in that the Court seems to have granted Hammett the right to use
his characters, but potentially stripped all future characters of
independent copyrightability in so doing. 77 Still, the “constitutes the
story” dicta—if they are indeed dicta—linger in the case law despite the
lambasting the relevant language has undergone. 78 Some courts have
made a point of addressing both standards, 79 presumably to avoid
reversal. 80
Independent copyright protection for characters thus requires that
characters satisfy one of two main tests, the “distinctive delineation test”
(used by a majority of courts) or the “constitutes the story being told”
test. 81 Besides these two formal tests courts use to determine characters’
independent copyrightability, there are numerous informal factors

Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 950.
Id.
74 See DOROTHY J. HOWELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES AND THE PROTECTION OF
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS 90 (1990) (stating that the Sam Spade case “is frequently cited to
support the proposition that character is uncopyrightable”).
75 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12 n.12; see also Kurtz, supra note 11, at 454 (calling the
test “very restrictive, far more restrictive than the Nichols standard”).
76 Olson, 855 F.2d at 1451 (emphasis added).
77 David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 455 (“The
author [was] left free to use his character in new stories, but so [was] everyone else.”).
78 Foley, supra note 15, at 930 (describing courts’ uncertainty over Sam Spade’s effective
authority, and stating that it “has never been generally accepted”).
79 “In an implicit acknowledgment of the unsettled state of the law, in considering the
characters at issue in Olson, the circuit court evaluates the characters in the suit under both
tests.” Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
80 Foley, supra note 15, at 930. “[O]ut of an abundance of caution this Court will determine
the protectability of the Rocky characters under both tests.” Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *7.
81 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
1954); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
72
73
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courts may also consider. 82 Some courts address both tests, producing
confusion and unpredictability. The law in this area is inconsistent,
unsettled, and unclear. 83
As the next two Parts show, the haphazard evolution of copyright
protection for characters has culminated in uncertain and aesthetically
non-neutral standards for protection. Courts routinely add elaborations
of degree or actual additional factors as requirements for
copyrightability. 84 This lack of clarity affects crucial aspects of the scope
of protection. The next two Parts turn to the larger theoretical and
cultural implications of copyright’s current treatment of literary
characters, and literature’s capacity to shine light on the doctrinal
confusion. Literature can show how copyright protection for characters
is problematic in three ways: how much of the character is protected,
which characters are protected, and whether characters should be
protected at all, if they are not “fixed” for the purposes of copyright law.
First, the law is unclear in regards to the outer boundaries of the
character it protects: the scope of protection is thus difficult to discern.
This is the character entanglement problem. Framed another way, which
parts of an independent character belong to the character, as opposed to
the text? Which parts are plot, which parts are style (itself largely
unprotected under copyright law if unaccompanied by other elements 85)
82 Under the “extrinsic test” for substantial similarity, courts look at whether subsequent
works use the character’s name, mannerisms, physical likeness (whether verbally or graphically
rendered), signature props or disguises, patterns of speech, and so on: The analysis is based on
objective qualities discernible to experts if not always to the average reader/viewer. Anderson,
1989 WL 206431, at *12. As part of their inquiry into the nature of the use made by defendants
and the importance of the preexisting work to the subsequent work, courts also look at whether
the characters are eponymous, whether the characters were borrowed in whole or in part,
whether they were borrowed literally, figuratively, allusively, or transformatively, etc.
83 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1295
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (“The law in the Ninth Circuit is unclear as to when visually-depicted
characters such as James Bond can be afforded copyright protection.”); Anderson, 1989 WL
206431, at *7 (calling the law “unsettled”); Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers:
Setting a New Standard for Character Copyrightability, 41 SANTA CLARA. L. REV. 341, 347
(2001) (referring to the “lack of clear standards” the case law evinces); Brylawski, supra note 15,
at 77 (calling character doctrine “inconsistent, unclear, and quixotic”); Kurtz, supra note 11, at
437.
84 Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
characters in the Ninth Circuit had been granted protection but only when they were “especially
distinctive”) (emphasis added); Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215–
16 (1998); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(characterizing earlier cases as requiring that characters be “sufficiently distinctive and defined”
to merit protection), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
85 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). I read
Steinberg to stand for the proposition that style by itself will not suffice for a finding of
infringement. In Steinberg, and other cases similarly focused on authorial style, there is usually
a great deal of overlapping subject matter. In Steinberg, the movie poster and The New Yorker
cover were stylistically similar, but a court did not need to decide whether style alone was
protectable because what had been borrowed was much more than style: The two works
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and which parts are distinctive character traits that constitute protected
expression?86 Second, characters are governed by legal standards that
are not value-neutral, which in turn skews the outcome regarding which
characters can and will be protected. We might call this the law’s
selection problem. Third, copyright law continues to protect characters
independently even though theories of reading—and empirical
evidence—show that literary characters actually change and evolve in
the minds of readers. Awareness of character’s evolution through
reading would suggest that, beyond their existence in words on the page,
characters may fail to meet copyright’s fundamental requirement of
fixation. This is the character fixation problem.
Together, the next two Parts demonstrate that using a literary lens
to view the doctrine underpinning independent copyright for characters
magnifies and clarifies the law’s confusion, which in turn should allow
legal regulators to focus more accurately effectively on ways to improve
the law.
II. WHY THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CHARACTERS IS
UNCLEAR
How much of a given character does—and should—the law
protect? How can courts discern where the text leaves off and the
character begins, for the purposes of substantial similarity analysis?
Ultimately, the answers to these questions implicate the nature and
scope of the derivative work right and could play a valuable role in
copyright reform. However, they are important in their own right as
procedural levers in copyright litigation. 87 This Part argues that literary
insights should be brought to bear on considerations of the proper scope
of protection for independent characters. Copyright can use literature to
think through whether more, or less, of a character should be protected
as a character, by inquiring into the extent to which characters can be
easily separated from their surrounding works.

captured a provincial view of a big city, with many substantive similarities that went well
beyond style. For more discussion, see infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text.
86 Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 711–12; KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 (referring to the “trouble
in extricating ‘character’ as a separately copyrightable element” and noting that some have
viewed the extricability of various features of a text all too blithely).
87 The amount and importance of the material taken from a work plays a role in courts’
substantial similarity analysis as well as in the second prong of fair use analysis, the amount,
and substantiality of the portions used.
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From Flat to Round to Unfixed: A Phylogenic Account of Characters

Literary texts show us that characters, as a group, and authorial
techniques used in representing characters, have evolved a great deal
over time. Authors have found new narrative ways, since at least the
early modern era, to show readers that characters may be conflicted or
divided, or to step inside and then back outside characters’ minds, in a
process that Blakey Vermeule calls “mind-reading” and another
canonical book on narrative refers to as “peering directly into the
[character’s] mind.” 88 Some have argued that their evolutionary
progress is (or was), stalled. 89 Still, no one would deny the tremendous
change in what James Phelan calls characters’ “dimensions”
(characteristics) and “functions” over the many centuries of recorded
literary representation. 90 The very techniques that make them highly
complex–narrative forms that were once experimental, such as interior
monologue, stream-of-consciousness, or free-indirect style–also make it
much more difficult to disentangle characters from their texts. 91 This
Part offers a few representative examples of such narrative experiments
and illustrates their relationship to the question of a character’s
disentanglement from her surrounding text.
Before launching into further discussion of character
disentanglement, a disclaimer is in order. This Article necessarily
uses broad historical brushstrokes rather than attempting in vain to
convey the transhistorical, transgeneric particulars of characters.
Conceding that it overgeneralizes in doing so, the Article nonetheless
relies on a handy temporal division: characters before the early
modern period were, with few exceptions, stock characters. 92 The
88 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 67–82 (2d ed.
2008); see also VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 63, 75 (“The history of literary forms is punctuated
by . . . changes designed to get inside the mind and go along for the ride. . . . Writers are always
coming up with new ways of getting inside”). SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, infra note 106, at
175. See generally DORRIT COHN, TRANSPARENT MINDS (1978).
89 MARY MCCARTHY, Characters in Fiction, in ON THE CONTRARY 271, 275 (1961)
(describing the evolution of narrative approaches to creating characters, and lamenting the
crisis in representation she perceives: “[novelists] are stuck in the phylogenesis of the novel”)
(alteration in original).
90 James Phelan, Thematic Reference, Literary Structure, and Fictive Character, 48
SEMIOTICA 345, 357 (1984).
91 ABBOTT, supra note 88, at 75, 78.
92 Consider as one significant example, Homer’s Iliad, which presents a rich case for
inferring historical differences in the representation of character. (“[B]ecause so many different
personages figure in the Iliad, each attributed with a distinct psychological characterization, the
Iliad is . . . a display of character and characterizations…and [an] intriguing text for tracing
ancient personality.”). Constantinos G. Passakos & Boele De Raad, Ancient Personality: Trait
Attributions to Characters in Homer’s Iliad, 7 ANCIENT NARRATIVE 75, 83 (2009). The work
names over 700 characters (including gods). Id. at 82. Yet “Homer does not seem to be
particularly interested in the psychological nature of man; there is no explicit psychology by
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state of literary study is so diverse, and so rich in history, it would be
impossible to capture the full range of critical perspectives that have
existed. Recently, however, there has been a notable resurgence of
interest in the topic of character, mobilized in part by theories of
readers’ responses, cognitive psychology, and a turn to affect in critical
theory. 93 It is with full awareness of more recent critical moves, then,
that this Article turns to a somewhat old-fashioned taxonomy,
according to which, following E.M. Forster, characters could be classed
as “flat,” or round. The latter are more fully psychologized characters
that tend to populate much contemporary literature and drama. 94
Forster defined flat characters as personalities “constructed round a
single idea or quality: when there is more than one factor in them, we
get the beginning of the curve towards the round. The really flat
character can be expressed in one sentence . . . .” 95 Such characters are
easy to recognize, 96 and easy to remember. 97 They remain comfortingly
similar despite changes in their circumstances, which help them to seem
frozen in time as the book itself ages. 98 They may never be taken
seriously, for though they make appeals to the emotions, they tend to
prompt laughter and to be associated with comedy. 99
Round characters, by contrast, are unpredictable, difficult to
summarize or recognize at a glance:
The test of a round character is whether it is capable of surprising in
a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not
convince, it is flat pretending to be round. It has the incalculability of
life about it—life within the pages of a book. 100

Characters such as these strike readers as more surprising, more
complex, more dynamic, and more human. They are harder to fix in the
mind, and harder to remember because they evolve throughout their
works. 101 Unlike flat characters, which appeal to the emotions, round
which Homer understands his characters. He seems to be an observer of the behavior of the
heroes, describes what they do, which decisions they take, and what they accomplish.” Id.
93 Felski, supra note 4, at v–vi.
94 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, at 277.
95 E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 67–68 (1955) (coining the terms “flat” and
“round” characters).
96 Flat characters are “easily recognized whenever they come in—recognized by the reader’s
emotional eye, not by the visual eye, which merely notes the recurrence of a proper name.” Id.
at 68.
97 Id. at 69.
98 Id. (“[T]hey were not changed by circumstances . . . which gives them in retrospect a
comforting quality, and preserves them when the book that produced them may decay.”).
99 MARY E. RAGLAND, RABELAIS AND PANURGE 41 (1976).
100 FORSTER, supra note 95, at 78.
101 A round character, unlike a flat one, exhibits change when difficult situations befall her.
She “passe[s through great scenes] and [is] modified by [them. In turn, readers] do not
remember her so easily because she waxes and wanes and has facets like a human being.” Id. at
69.
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characters appeal to the intellect. 102 They are perhaps rightly considered
the hallmark of modern literature.
Though flat characters can appear in the modern era—indeed, they
tend to populate mass-market literature—they constituted the dominant
mode of representation during the earliest centuries of literary
representation. 103 Some examples of individualized characters do
predate the modern era: Odysseus stands out as a highly particularized
figure whose famously recognizable scar is perhaps the outward
manifestation of his uniqueness. 104 But examples of classical or premodern highly individualized or psychologically complex characters are
rather more uncommon, and this is reflected in the narrative function
assigned to them, to the names authors chose for them, and to the
relationship they bore to their textual predecessors. 105
Another, slightly less stark way of distinguishing between earlier
and modern characters is loosely to classify the former as static and the
latter as dynamic. Early characters are often static: they do not evolve
during the course of their narratives, even though they may undergo
trauma or experience difficulty, as, say, Achilles and Odysseus do. 106 In
this sense, they are flat in Forster’s terminology. Modern characters are
more dynamic. Dynamic characters undergo change, although they may
do so in ways that are very predictable, and follow a path that conforms
to external plot factors, or they may do so in idiosyncratic,
psychological, or irrational ways. Dynamic characters that evolve
according to the dictates of plot or moral allegory are known as
“developmental” characters, and dynamic characters that evolve in
individualized fashion across narrative time, are known as
“chronological” characters. 107 The dynamic character category thus
bifurcates into developmental characters, which are similar to flat
characters that undergo change purely for plot purposes, and
chronological characters, which are round, in that they evolve over time,
as humans do. Developmental characters are simplistic; they may
change during the course of their narrative, but only “so as to clarify
RAGLAND, supra note 99, at 41.
IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON AND FIELDING 15
(1957) (enumerating historical changes paving the way for the rise of the novel: “To begin with,
the actors in the plot and the scene of their actions had to be placed in a new literary
perspective: the plot had to be acted out by particular people in particular circumstances, rather
than, as had been common in the past, by general human types against a background primarily
determined by the appropriate literary convention.”).
104 ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE
5, 476 (1971).
105 See, e.g., JOEL FINEMAN, SHAKESPEARE’S PERJURED EYE: THE INVENTION OF POETIC
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE SONNETS (1986); WATT, supra note 103, at 17.
106 ROBERT SCHOLES, JAMES PHELAN & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 169
(2006).
107 Id. at 169–70.
102
103
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[their] progress along a plot line which has an ethical basis . . . .”108
Chronological characters are complex, “highly mimetic,” and
sophisticated. They represent the difference in narrative representations
of, to borrow from Forster, “life by values” versus “life by time.” 109
It would be very difficult to summarize the full range of character
taxonomies that have over time been proposed in literary scholarship,
and trying to summarize all the critical responses to those would be
more challenging still. The sheer number of approaches—mythic,
structuralist,
religious,
allegorical,
ethical,
psychoanalytical,
psychological, feminist, and so on—dazzles. The various taxonomies
discussed here focus on classifying characters into groups that copyright
law might be able to use as part of identifying its own foibles. These
taxonomies can contribute value even if they only hint at the complex
stratification that has evolved in literary theory in tandem with literary
history. Characters have been considered many different things at many
different times, and been variously pronounced of utmost interest, or of
no interest, along the way. Though artificially simplifying, it is helpful to
draw one particular line, between early characters and modern, or
contemporary, characters.
For a considerable part of early literary history, characters were
understood across many cultures and languages as stock tropes upon
which small variations could be overlain. 110 Their flatness did not make
them lesser characters, or their readers “dupes;” these characters simply
belonged to different forms of reading, different social and intellectual
modes that can be more clearly understood outside the system of
mimetic representation. 111 Indeed, in Aristotle’s Poetics, he subordinates
them almost entirely to plot and structure. 112 One could say that
characters were mere structures, or actors, within the work’s larger
structures. 113 Agents were necessary to carry out the plot, but
individualization of any kind could be added after the fact. 114 Characters
were heroes or villains (or gods) mobilized into action by (other) gods,
by externally dictated duties, or by dramatic imperatives. 115 There was
little of the self-exploration, vacillation, dividedness, or depth that the
Id. at 169.
Id.
110 Id. at 164.
111 LYNCH, supra note 22, at 10–11.
112 ARISTOTLE, POETICS 24 (N.G.L. Hammond trans., Museum Tusculanum Press 2001)
(Advising would-be authors: “[w]hen the general [plot] outline is completed and not before,
one should add the names, expand the story and insert the episodes . . . .”); see also RONALD S.
CRANE, THE LANGUAGES OF CRITICISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY 73 (1953).
113 The echo of the Sam Spade opinion’s “vehicles of the story being told” dicta bears
mentioning, and receives fuller treatment. See supra Part I.C.
114 SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION AND
FILM 109 (1978).
115 Id. at 108–10.
108
109
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modern reader has come to associate with the depiction of characters. 116
To be effective, classical characters did not need to be complex, only
virtuous and consistent. 117 During this pre-individualized era, characters
were reducible to types—mere names even—to be inserted around the
structural components of the story. 118
However, between the Renaissance and the eighteenth century,
characters evolved a great deal, with respect to both depth and
complexity. Around the early modern period—some scholars have
argued that Shakespeare deserves the credit or serves as a point of
origin 119—characters became more atypical, more introspective and
sophisticated. 120 In other words, characters began to shift from being
organized by “type” to being organized by “individual.” 121 One subgenre demonstrates this paradigm shift neatly: the character sketch. 122 In
the seventeenth century, a literary genre emerged in the form of the
character sketch, which began to associate the meaning of “character”
with the depiction of particular personalities, rather than merely with
general virtues and vices of character associated with earlier classical
literature. 123 The character sketch originated with Theophrastus, a
student of Aristotle and author of a set of thirty brief but witty sketches

116 Recall by comparison that the early novel can be characterized as subordinating “plot to
the pattern of the autobiographical memoir,” manifesting its insistence as an emerging genre on
“the primacy of individual experience . . . .” WATT, supra note 103, at 15.
117 ARISTOTLE, supra note 112, at 27 (stating, in his chapter 14, entitled “Character”: “[i]n
regard to character the playwright should have four aims . . . the characters should be
good. . . . characters should be appropriate. . . . characters should be like to those which
tradition portrays, and this is different from making the character good and appropriate in our
sense of the words. . . . [and] characters should be consistent. Even when the subject of the
representation is inconsistent and affords an inconsistency of character, he should still be
consistently inconsistent.”).
118 Uri Margolin, Characterization in Narrative: Some Theoretical Prolegomena, 67
NEOPHILOLOGUS 1, 2 (1983) (referring to instances in which characters were plot devices, or
mere “architecture”).
119 WATT, supra note 103, at 17 (arguing that such individualized representation could be
but was not always found in Shakespeare; by contrast, it was everywhere to be found in the
“narrative manner of [modern novels]”).
120 HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY xxvii–xxviii (2d ed.
1997) (“Falstaff, Hamlet, and Iago are creators of language, while Shakespeare, by their means,
created us. . . . [M]ore than any other writer, or any other person that we know of, thought
everything through again for himself. Shakespeare did not think one thought and one thought
only; rather scandalously, he thought all thoughts, for all of us. . . . The issue is not belief but
our human nature, so intensified by Shakespeare as to be his re-invention.”).
121 David Venturo, The Satiric Character Sketch, in A COMPANION TO SATIRE: ANCIENT AND
MODERN 561 (Ruben Quintero ed., 2007) (describing why the character sketch began to lose its
force as a form of typology).
122 The character sketch originated with the ethical parables of the ancient Greeks, including
Tyrtamos of Lesbos, commonly known as Theophrastus. CHARACTER WRITINGS OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (Henry Morley ed., 1891).
123 ARISTOTLE, supra note 112, at 27.
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that marked a new form of “literary portraiture.” 124 The Theophrastan
sketch served as the model for many generations of authors of character
writings, and it held particular interest for writers in England and
Europe during the Enlightenment. 125
The evolution of the character sketch based on general and
abstracted virtues or vices to the more particularized biographical
character portrait reflected a significant epistemological change. What
Ian Watt has called the rise of “[t]he concept of realistic particularity”
came with narrative features that, as the Article shows below, have
important implications for copyright policy. 126 David Venturo notes the
“shift from constructing character sketches deductively, in order to
illustrate a trait or ethos, to constructing them inductively, based on a
writer’s knowledge, preferably direct and empirical, of the individual he
is seeking to draw.” 127
This epistemological shift from deductive to inductive character
rendering attests to the greater importance placed on individualizing
aspects of character. 128 It also underscores the new kind of work being
done by characters, and the new sorts of expectations with which
readers increasingly encountered characters. 129 Characters became
newly individualized. From texts populated by figures described in
terms of structural roles, exterior surfaces, or discernable attributes—
such as the Icelandic sagas, for example—narrative witnessed a shift to
the evocation of particularized figures with increasingly developed

124 Jeffrey Rusten, Introduction to THEOPHRASTUS, CHARACTERS 5, 8, 9 (Jeffrey Rusten &
I.C. Cunningham, eds., 2002). His characters typically began “X man is the sort who” and then
described a personality flaw with vivid examples drawn from fourth-century BCE Athens. As
an example of the sort of portrait Theophrastus drew, under “Overzealousness,” Theophrastus
offers eleven annoying character traits, including: “(1) You can be sure overzealousness will
seem to be a well-intentioned appropriation of words and actions. The overzealous man is the
sort (2) who gets up and promises to do things he won’t be able to carry out . . . (5) He tries to
stop fights even between strangers to him. (6) He leads the way down a path, but then can’t find
the way to where he is going.”). Id.
125 See J.W. SMEED, THE THEOPHRASTAN ‘CHARACTER’ 47 (1985) (dedicating a monograph
to the influence Theophrastus had on writers including, among many others, Thomas
Overbury, Joseph Hall, John Earle (in seventeenth-century England), and La Bruyère (whose
Les Caractères De Théophraste Traduits Du Grec, Avec Les Caractères Ou Les Moeurs De Ce
Siècle (1688) is an acknowledged classic and an influential work in its own right)).
126 WATT, supra note 103, at 17.
127 Venturo, supra note 121, at 561.
128 Earlier models of deductive character analysis had drawn on general traits or didactic
principles of behavior to create composites that stood for a given personality. These moved
from the general, to the specific. Later models in the inductive tradition moved from specific
personalities to depictions of character that could be used to adduce something more general
about human nature, or a given moment in history. In other words, they harnessed the specific
to gesture to the general.
129 LYNCH, supra note 22, at 6.
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interiors that were hidden from view, but knowable, in part, by
readers. 130
By the eighteenth century, characters had assumed a singular
importance in their works 131 and in the literary market. 132 Character
sketches were used as political satires in fiction, but they had also
become a “staple” in non-fiction narrative works. 133 The role for
characters to play in narratives of all sorts had by the eighteenth century
grown quite significant. Characters, it would seem, were everywhere to
be found. Public reception magnified the role characters did and could
play. 134 Whether characters dominated the title and plotlines, or simply
found themselves, even as bit players, to be the focus of newly detailed
descriptions (“sketches”) novelists began to place throughout their
works, characters and their personalities had taken on new
importance. 135 Some works of fiction consisted solely of compilations of
character portraits. 136
The rise of the novel, and especially the psychological novel,
correlated with the growing interest in character, since this form was
perhaps uniquely interested in exploring personality. 137 In turn, the
emphasis on characters may also be traceable to the rise of mimesis, or
realism, in literary representation, and the new forms of narrative

130 SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 172 (“Saga characterization is an
almost pure and perfect example of the external approach to character. . . . But the sagas never
attempt to penetrate inside the character. Only words and actions are described; thoughts are
never analyzed.”). The monolithic nature of this characterization holds true for the epic genre
also. Id. at 173.
131 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 50.
132 See also LYNCH, supra note 22, at 5 (describing the rise of a new “economy of characters”
thus: “Literary character’s history thus converges . . . with a history that sees writing and
reading themselves become commercialized, fashionable activities. In this same period, rival
syndicates of booksellers went to court over literary property, the first circulating libraries made
books available for hire, and books came to be numbered among the possessible keepsakes and
knickknacks that people had to learn to use as they learned to personalize the interior spaces of
their homes and their selves.”).
133 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 51; Venturo, supra note 121, at 561.
134 For example, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, became a publishing event that permeated
society, and literary creation, thoroughly. It had been preceded by Richardson’s equally loved,
imitated, and mocked, Pamela. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 50–51.
135 Id.
136 Sketches By Boz (1836), by Charles Dickens with illustrations by George Cruikshank,
provides one such example. CHARLES DICKENS, SKETCHES BY BOZ: ILLUSTRATIVE OF EVERYDAY LIFE AND EVERY-DAY PEOPLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1957). The Impressions of Theophrastus
Such (1879), by George Eliot, provides another. It takes its eponymous character’s name from
the classic character sketch author, Theophrastus. GEORGE ELIOT, THE IMPRESSIONS OF
THEOPHRASTUS SUCH xix (Everyman 1995) (“Theophrastus, a Greek philosopher of the late
third century BC, is regarded as the inventor of ‘character writing’: moral portraits of sundry
human types . . . .”).
137 W.J. HARVEY, CHARACTER AND THE NOVEL 23 (1965) (“[M]ost great novels exist to
reveal and explore character.”).
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discourse it popularized. 138 The works of modern authors, such as
Anton Chekhov, for instance, feature more investigation of characters’
inner selves than major plot events. 139 Henry James and Edith Wharton
are another two modern authors who similarly emphasized
psychological states rather than actions with regard to their characters.
James’s prioritization of character was, for example, distinctly antiAristotelian. 140 For James, one might say, plot was an excuse to
showcase character; for Aristotle, recall, the opposite had been true.141
Though these modern authors clearly owe a good deal to literary
precursors with an interest in exploring the representation of selfhood,
they mark the modern period as a time of considerable emphasis on the
development and portrayal of character. 142 As a function of the growing
interest in exploring—and reading about—selfhood in narrative, new
techniques and genres with which to portray personhood arose.
Seeing the evolution in authorial representations of selfhood
through a literary lens helps address an underlying symptom of
copyright’s confusing treatment of characters. That is, as characters
became more important, they became harder to disentangle from their
texts, in ways that have consequences for copyright law.

138 AUERBACH, supra note 104, at 23 (describing Odysseus’s homecoming as a starting point
for a particular kind of “literary representation of reality in European culture” but showing how
Homer’s characterization consisted of largely external details); WATT, supra note 103, at 12–13
(“Modern realism . . . begins from the position that truth can be discovered by the individual
through his senses . . . The novel is the form of literature which most fully reflects this
individualist and innovating reorientation. Previous literary forms had reflected the general
tendency of their cultures to make conformity to traditional practice the major test of
truth . . . [for] the novel, whose primary criterion was truth to individual experience—
individual experience . . . is always unique and therefore new.”).
139 Margolin, supra note 118, at 6; see also CHATMAN, supra note 114, at 113 (“One
could . . . argue that character is supreme and plot derivative, to justify the modernist narrative
in which ‘nothing happens,’ that is, the events themselves do not form an independent source
of interest . . . .”).
140 “[I]t was almost always character, and not story, that presented itself first to his
imagination. But then began the task of shaping and refining the ‘germ’ of his characters so that
they might fulfill their task persuasively in a story with a certain emotive power.” MARY DOYLE
SPRINGER, A RHETORIC OF LITERARY CHARACTER: SOME WOMEN OF HENRY JAMES 6 (1978).
141 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
142 Chaucer, Boccaccio, and Dante, among many others in the western tradition alone,
offered versions of character sketches through which Theophrastan influence can be traced, but
they are also important in the phylogeny of character development in their own right. See, e.g.,
GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, THE DECAMERON (Mark Musa & Peter E. Bondanella, eds. & trans.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1977); GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES: FIFTEEN TALES AND
THE GENERAL PROLOGUE (V.A. Kolve & Glending Olson eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed.
2005).
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Innovation, Complexity, and the Rise of Characters’ Inextricability

B.

Narrative experiments with form produced several techniques and
new genres that would be recast as mainstream modes of representation
by the early twentieth century. These techniques include, among others,
the soliloquy (or dramatic aside); the dramatic monologue; the interior
monologue; stream-of-consciousness narration; first-person narration;
and free indirect discourse. 143 All of these arguably heighten the reader’s
experience of an individualized character; these techniques make
characters feel more real. 144 Authors’ experiments with innovative
narrative techniques created characters that seemed more nuanced,
more individualized, and more complex; these characters were rounder,
to borrow from Forster’s terminology. Narrative techniques, in short,
made characters more human. 145
In turn, however, these techniques complicated whether copyright
law can disentangle a character from his text, can distinguish between a
character and the language used by, about, and around her. Modes of
creating interiority knitted the character more thoroughly through the
text and made her less easily extricated from it. In one of the most
important character cases of the present decade, Salinger v. Colting, the
court noted the entanglement problem in passing: “It is difficult, in fact,
to separate Holden Caulfield from the book.” 146
These more complex, more “real” characters could be crafted in
ways that resisted narrative conventions and seemed to subvert
conventional types found in earlier literature. Such characters defied, or
at least played with, readers’ expectations and narrative conventions.
They often displayed awareness of themselves as characters in a larger
narrative. 147 For example, consider the opening of The Catcher in the
Rye, narrated by Holden Caulfield:
143

ABBOTT, supra note 88, at 70. Free indirect discourse or style consists of

[t]hird-person narration in which a character’s thoughts or expressions are presented
in the character’s voice without being set off by quotation marks or the usual
addition of phrases like ‘he thought’ or ‘she said’ and without shifting into
grammatical first-person discourse: ‘It was a hot day. What on earth was she doing
lugging stones on a day like this?’ Here, the second sentence is marked by [the
speaker’s] intonations, but it is cast in the third person and in the past tense, neither
of which she would use, were she speaking or thinking this question.
Id. at 234; see also SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 177–78.
144 WATT, supra note 103, at 22.
145 Id. at 27 (“The various technical characteristics of the novel described above all seem to
contribute to . . . the production of what purports to be an authentic account of the actual
experience of individuals.”).
146 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting District Court Hearing (June
17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)).
147 LAURENCE STERNE, TRISTRAM SHANDY 78 (1966) (“You see as plain as can be, that I write
as a man of erudition; that even my similies [sic], my allusions, my illustrations, my metaphors,
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If you really want to hear about it, the first thing you’ll probably want
to know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like,
and how my parents were occupied and all before they had me, and
all that David Copperfield kind of crap, but I don’t feel like going
into it, if you want to know the truth. In the first place, that stuff
bores me, and in the second place, my parents would have about two
hemorrhages apiece if I told anything pretty personal about them.
They’re quite touchy about anything like that, especially my father.
They’re nice and all—I’m not saying that—but they’re also touchy as
hell. Besides, I’m not going to tell you my whole goddam
autobiography or anything. 148

Holden addresses his allusion directly to the reader, anticipating
familiarity with David Copperfield. He signals his unwillingness to
participate in the Dickensian narrative tradition, with its conventions of
sentimentality, flat characters, and recitation of a character’s
background. 149 Yet in spite of his critique, he delivers such background
details even as he disavows them. He does so by hinting to the reader
about his relationship to his parents, revealing his adolescent
prickliness, 150 and undercutting his own words about his father’s
“touchiness” through his emotionally quicksilver and defensive
remarks. 151 The first-person voice here allows the speaker to situate
himself within a literary genre, but then to reject its demands.
Comparing David Copperfield with his own “lousy childhood” creates a
strong sense of irony and prepares readers for the intermittently tough,
sarcastic tone with which Holden has become associated in the cultural
imagination. Precisely because of this exterior toughness, Holden’s
departures into sincerity and vulnerability constitute the other side of
his appealing emotional coin. First-person narration allowed authors to
meld narrative and drama in effective and surprising new ways that
innovated literary form and offered more highly tailored, individualistic
depictions of fictional characters.
Individualizing characters in this way relied on narrative
experiments that, over time, earned legitimacy as mainstream modes of
narrative discourse. These techniques, however, also blurred the
boundaries between text and character. Such narrative innovations
are erudite,—and that I must sustain my character properly, and contrast it properly too,—else
what would become of me? Why, Sir, I should be undone . . . .”).
148 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 3 (2001).
149 Id. (“[T]hat stuff bores me”). See generally VALERIE PURTON, DICKENS AND THE
SENTIMENTAL TRADITION: FIELDING, RICHARDSON, STERNE, GOLDSMITH, SHERIDAN, LAMB
(2012).
150 SALINGER, supra note 148, at 3 (“I’m not going to tell you my whole goddam
autobiography.”).
151 Note the italics on: “They’re nice and all” and the em-dashes setting off “I’m not saying
that” as if someone has suggested he has said precisely that. The book shows us, before its end,
that Holden himself is in fact “touchy as hell.” Id.
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central to representing character interiority as the soliloquy, first-person
narration, and the dramatic monologue have many literary benefits, but
all of them lead to a problem for copyright law. Where does the text end
and the character begin, if independent copyright protection will cover
that character? How should courts treat subsequent uses of a character
whose existence in the original work is first described through means
that conflate—or seem to conflate—the character with the text?
Authors sometimes use these self-oriented narrative techniques
because of the distance they can create between the character and the
work. Yet sometimes the opposite obtains, and techniques such as these
actually collapse the distance between character and text. A case in
point: the soliloquy in Shakespeare’s plays has been shown, at different
places in his œuvre, and at different moments in literary interpretation,
both to reveal a character’s selfhood and to obscure it. Sometimes the
soliloquy poses as a moment of truth personal to the speaker but
represents “just those moments when the speaker steps out of character
to make an expository utterance, to speak not for his own particular
perspective but for the general perspective of the play.” 152 The dramatic
monologue, in Robert Browning’s hands, notoriously puts readers in an
uncomfortable position as they try to retreat from the moral ugliness
discernible in his protagonists to higher narrative ground, but find
nowhere to go. 153 Readers find themselves caught between “sympathy”
for and “judgment” of the speaker. 154 To read “Porphyria’s Lover,” 155 or
“My Last Duchess,” is to listen to an unpleasant (homicidal) man
rationalizing his savagery. 156 The pull towards sympathy created by the
152 ROBERT LANGBAUM, THE POETRY OF EXPERIENCE: THE DRAMATIC MONOLOGUE IN
MODERN LITERARY TRADITION 160–61 (1957).
153 ALAN SINFIELD, DRAMATIC MONOLOGUE 3–5 (1977) (describing readers’ responses to
Browning’s monologues as falling somewhere between “perplexity and discouragement”).
154 LANGBAUM, supra note 152, at 182–209.
155 ROBERT BROWNING’S POETRY 83–84 (James Loucks & Andrew Stauffer eds., 2d ed. 2007).
In “Porphyria’s Lover,” a speaker describes the emotional power his lover has over him, and
confesses to having murdered her so as to keep her close to him:

[A]t last I knew/Porphyria worshipped me; surprise/Made my heart swell, and still it
grew/While I debated what to do./That moment she was mine, mine, fair,/Perfectly
pure and good: I found/A thing to do, and all her hair/In one long yellow string I
wound/Three times her little throat around/And strangled her. No pain felt she;/I am
quite sure she felt no pain.
Id. The speaker then describes opening her eyes, holding her and kissing her, and staying up all
night with her in his arms.
156 In “My Last Duchess,” the speaker, poised before a portrait of his late wife, describes
having had her murdered, citing her happiness and gratitude towards the world as the reason.
His words reveal that his psychopathic jealousy, not the stated (and implausible) cause, were
responsible for the killing. “She had/A heart—how shall I say?—too soon made glad,/Too easily
impressed; she liked whate’er/She looked on, and her looks went everywhere” (l. 21-24). “[A]ll
and each/Would draw from her alike the approving speech,/Or blush, at least. She thanked
men,—good! but thanked/Somehow—I know not how—as if she ranked/My gift of a nine-
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first-person voice, coupled with the judgment elicited by the horrific
nature of the cruelty described, produces a deep irony in the poem. 157
This complexity is a function of the blurring between the character and
the text, the voice of the Duke and, one suspects, Browning’s own
restrained judging of him. 158
Likewise, first-person narration blurs the boundaries between
character and text in ways that exacerbate the problem of entanglement
for character law in copyright. In first-person narration, a gap opens
often immediately, between the statements the speaker makes, and the
extent to which a reader takes those statements at face value. In the
excerpt from Catcher in the Rye, above, the reference to the “lousy
childhood” raises a question for the first-time reader of the novel: was
Holden’s childhood actually “lousy” (is the speaker sincere, and bitter)
or was his childhood not in reality lousy (thus depriving him of the
stated justification for his posture of bitterness, and ironizing the
reference to David Copperfield, whose childhood genuinely was pretty
lousy)? Authors derive narrative force from manipulating their
narrators’ capacity to inspire belief as well as disbelief in readers, that is,
from exploiting that continually arising gap between what the narrator
purposely “tells” and what he inadvertently “shows.” 159
Through this narrative strategy, authors force readers to continue
to renegotiate their relationships to characters, in turn complicating
how copyright law can be expected to analyze characters’ autonomous
existence. An author may use first-person narration to highlight that
(speaking) character, or to highlight other characters through a onestep-removed-from-center sort of consciousness. 160 Alternatively, the
first-person narrator may be a “ficelle” character, an expository device
often found in the works of Henry James, sometimes used to structure
the narrative by allowing proportionately arranged observations to
dictate the story, rather than allowing the story to proceed based on the
inner world of a character whose (perhaps disproportionately)
emotional life might require a different (and aesthetically messy)
structure. 161 Mary Doyle Springer writes (quoting James) that the device
spares readers “the heavy-handed narrator . . . [and] ‘the terrible fluidity
of self-revelation’ in first-person narration” but the ficelle does not
hundred-years-old name/With anybody’s gift. . . . /This grew; I gave commands;/Then all
smiles stopped together. There she stands/As if alive” (l. 29-34). Id.
157 SINFIELD, supra note 153, at 6.
158 Id. (“‘My Last Duchess’ is continuously and radically ironic, for every line consists
simultaneously of the Duke’s statements and Browning’s implications which we must work to
realize in ourselves.”).
159 WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION 16 (1961).
160 SPRINGER, supra note 140, at 165.
161 Id. at 166. This was James’s reason for adopting the ficelle; he abhorred what he thought
of as narrative “looseness” or undisciplined form. Id. at 1.
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eliminate “possible confusion about just how central or ‘main’ [readers]
are to take him to be.” 162 Hence even literary criticism finds itself
occasionally confounded by the existence of a character that uses firstperson narration, and unable to ascertain the character’s actual
importance to the text (whether his centrality is actual or ironic, for
instance). For copyright law to be able to determine which parts of the
text ought to be associated with–treated as independent property that
“belong” with—certain characters for the purposes of independent
character protection in substantial similarity analysis, seems an
improbably difficult task, destined to inspire bad case law.
C.

Disentangling Character from Text and Style

In its most sophisticated forms, then, the contemporary character
is frequently difficult to separate from its text. Literature exposes the
need for clear-eyed focus on the definitional boundaries of a character
so long as copyright continues to give these boundaries such implicit
force in making distributional determinations. How courts define
characters plays a crucial role both in determining whether independent
copyright protection subsists, and whether it has been violated.
Literature also reveals the complexity in any attempt to define character.
The difficulty need not mean the task is not worth undertaking, but
literature helps show what is at stake if copyright ignores the
entanglement problem, and it cuts in favor of finding an approach that
does not require dependence on the outer boundaries of a character for
fair adjudication.
Copyright has implicitly struggled with characters’ entanglement
with their texts in its attempts to define character, but it has yet to think
through the consequences of this definitional difficulty. Often, a court’s
attempts to reason its way to a solid definition of “character” fall flat.
The definition may be tautological, unclear, or simply wrong, even at
times in a thoughtful, otherwise well-reasoned opinion offered up by a
court with plenty of experience adjudicating artistic property issues. For
example, consider this judicial attempt to grapple with a definition of
character, and a supporting rationale for that definition: “The characters
from ‘Star Wars’ are elements in a drama; they have ‘character’ because
they are part of a plot in which they interact with each other. Thus, they
have attributes which are suggested by the movie itself.” 163 The
definition here is a moving target: first the characters are merely
constitutive parts in a larger work; then they are thought to derive their
Id. at 166–67.
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
162
163
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“character” from their role in a plot, perhaps because of or through their
interactions with other such characters; then it is their “attributes”
which can be traced to the larger work. The thinking here is manifestly
unclear. It highlights an important problem in character jurisprudence,
namely, that it is not easy to distinguish between a character and her
surrounding work, and that courts, even in copyright-savvy
jurisdictions, struggle in their efforts to define a character’s scope vis-àvis the surrounding text.
Leonard Zissu, a commentator on character law—and a leading
attorney in character case law 164—provides a helpful starting definition
though he defines character very broadly:
[A] character comprises some or all of such elements as (and
principally) the name, physical appearance and attributes,
mannerisms, speech and expressions, habits, attire, setting and locale.
His association with the other designated characters and his outlook
or view of life (subjective indicia) may also be regarded as within the
composite which denotes the character. 165

Zissu’s inclusion of “setting” and “locale,” as well as a character’s
“association” with other characters, attests to the breadth of scope
imagined for characters under one view of copyright law. To the extent
that Zissu’s character is so broad as defined, it practically does
“constitute the story being told.” Only other characters, or narrative
commentary, appear to be excluded. Still, those exclusions are an
important one, which involve complex line-drawing.
Copyright law has no accurate tools for such line-drawing, that is,
for determining which parts of the character consist of protected
expression that—in the property-rights logic that copyright seems to
adopt in thinking of structuring and allocating entitlements—“belong”
to one character rather than another, or to the separable character rather
than the text.
In many contemporary forms of narrative, it can be difficult indeed
to distinguish between narrative commentary and the interior
monologue of a given character. In fact, this is arguably the point of free
indirect discourse. Literary scholars disagree over whether such
narrative intertwining is hostile to characters 166 or can be friendly to
them, 167 but under either view, what is clear is that a purposeful
164 Zissu served as Hammett’s attorney in the Sam Spade case and also litigated the Tarzan
case before the Southern District in 1981.
165 Zissu, supra note 15, at 122.
166 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 72 (“Free indirect discourse holds the narrative voice
somewhere in between the first and the third person. But it is not benign. Writers use it to slice
the heads off their characters. . . . No character ever comes off well when free indirect discourse
tries to lend a hand.”).
167 Daniel P. Gunn, Free Indirect Discourse and Narrative Authority in Emma, 12
NARRATIVE 35, 35 (2004).
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commingling of voices takes place. 168 When information about
characters can be gleaned, it may reach the reader through any number
of different formal devices. Ought the law to consider this information
as representing the character, or the text, for the purposes of character
disentanglement analysis? 169 Narrative’s technical complexity frustrates
this aspect of copyright analysis.
Note that literature does not purport to hold easy answers to
character’s entanglement. 170 Although in theory, a character’s functions
might be separable from her dimensions, in practice, such distinctions
are exceedingly difficult to draw for literary scholars, let alone for
courts. 171 For copyright, however, real-world consequences may attach
when the definition of the character expands or contracts. For example,
a character borrowed for unauthorized use in a subsequent work may be
recognizable to readers, even if the surrounding subsequent work differs
greatly from the preexisting work, such that substantial similarity
analysis between the two works would fail. Courts would proceed to
analyze substantial similarity between characters alone. But where they
draw the line around the character will matter. Courts have protected
characters’ names (when accompanied by at least some other
characteristics); characters’ catchphrases; visual depictions of characters;
and so on. What literary understandings of character show is the
oversimplification of this view of characters’ easily discernible
relationship to their texts.
For the purposes of copyright, an additional problem lies in the
extent to which aspects of character should more properly be
characterized as artistic style, which by itself is not copyrightable. In
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., at issue lay a promotional
movie poster mimicking the work of Saul Steinberg, a New Yorker
magazine cartoonist famed for his illustration depicting a New Yorker’s
Id.
SPRINGER, supra note 140, at 42 (“Modern fiction is a highly narrative art (though it is a
highly delicate and necessary task to decide which parts are truly narrative and which
inherently dramatic . . . . And we must not discount what we can learn about character through
the rhetoric of diction, of narrative reports, descriptions, quotations, and lyric outbursts by a
narrator or secondary characters, information often colored by a single strong point of view.”).
170 John Frow, Spectacle Binding: On Character, 7 POETICS TODAY 227, 227 (1986) (“The
concept of character is perhaps the most problematic and the most undertheorized of the basic
categories of narrative theory. It is also perhaps the most widely-used of all critical tools, at all
levels of analysis; and its sheer obviousness disguises the conceptual difficulties it presents.”).
171 Phelan provides helpful framing for considering the form and role of characters
throughout literature.
168
169

A dimension is any aspect, feature, or quality a character may be said to possess when
that character is considered in isolation from the work in which he or she appears. A
function is any aspect, feature, or quality of a character that fulfills some purpose in
connection with the other elements of the work. Every function depends upon a
dimension but not every dimension will necessarily correspond to a function.
Phelan, supra note 90, at 357.
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parochial view of the world. 172 Defendants allegedly copied the concept
behind the poster and its execution, in promoting their upcoming film
“Moscow on the Hudson.” 173 Both works present a myopic view of the
horizon, suggesting New York’s inflated sense of its importance to the
world. 174 Several elements could potentially have been elided, but the
court’s careful attention to style, as against the idea of the posters, their
actual subject matter, and finally their expression, was thoughtful and
thorough. 175 After describing the two works, the court recognized that
“defendants cannot be held liable for using the idea of a map of the
world from an egocentrically myopic perspective.” 176 It turned to the
modes of executing the idea used in both posters, focusing on the print;
the “sketchy, whimsical style” of the renderings; the vantage point; the
particular scene used to express New York’s self-satisfied viewpoint; the
colors and their symbolic attributes (blue: sky; red: horizon); and the
perspective on New York city traffic. 177 The court concluded that
plaintiff’s poster had depicted more than merely scènes à faire, and
described the depiction of both the particular view of New York and the
means of capturing it as far from inevitable. 178
Yet in grappling with what precisely it might be protecting, the
court struggled to determine whether style was an integral part of the
work, something that permeated it, or something extricable from it, a
small quantum that could be evaluated apart from the work’s other
elements. The court stated: “[T]his case involves the entire protected
work and an iconographically, as well as proportionately, significant
portion of the allegedly infringing work.” 179 In thinking of the
“iconographically significant” elements borrowed, the court comes
dangerously close to protecting style. Steinberg seems to have been
trying to stress that in fact not only style was appropriated here;
defendants copied plaintiff’s style in addition to the subject matter he
chose. Thus the case might have been a closer one. 180
Steinberg presents a helpful parallel for analyzing character
protection. The court concluded that it could parse style from content
and suggested that style is not, by itself, protectable. Literary evidence
shows us that in many instances, characters may embody authorial style,
making such parsing difficult. How characters are imagined in
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 708.
174 Id. at 710.
175 Id. at 710–11.
176 Id. at 712.
177 Id. at 710, 712–13.
178 Id. at 712–13.
179 Id. at 713.
180 Without conceded access, a higher degree of similarity could have been required, for
instance. Id. at 714.
172
173
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relationship to their surrounding texts informs whether style will
inadvertently be protected. If characters can be conceived of as
comprising textual components that include stylistic features (such as
point of view, narrative devices, manner of rendition), then downstream
users who use the verbal equivalent of many “iconographically
significant” elements of the work may find that they have impermissibly
borrowed a character. This could be true even though the subsequent
work is dissimilar from the preexisting work, and, absent characters,
nothing but (theoretically uncopyrightable) style has been borrowed.
Literature illustrates that this fine distinction presents a clear linedrawing problem for the law. Returning to the example of The Catcher
in the Rye, consider the following passage, which describes Holden’s
late-night visit to his former teacher. Mr. Antolini gives Holden advice
late at night, and as he listens, Holden gets sleepier and sleepier:
I don’t know if you’ve ever done it, but it’s sort of hard to sit around
waiting for somebody to say something when they’re thinking and
all. It really is. I kept trying not to yawn. It wasn’t that I was bored or
anything—I wasn’t—but I was so damn sleepy all of a
sudden. . . . Then all of a sudden, I yawned. What a rude bastard, but
I couldn’t help it! . . . I could’ve slept standing up I was so tired. . . . I
got in bed with just my shorts on. It was way too short for me, the
couch, but I really could’ve slept standing up without batting an
eyelash. I laid awake for just a couple of seconds thinking about all
the stuff Mr. Antolini’d told me. About finding out the size of your
mind and all. He was really a pretty smart guy. But I couldn’t keep
my goddam eyes open, and I fell asleep. 181

The passage evokes Holden in his iconic specificity. Yet trying to
distinguish between the character-related aspects of the passage
(potentially copyrightable) and the merely stylistic ones (theoretically
not copyrightable) is difficult indeed. Many of the details that make
Holden who he “is” are hard to distinguish from authorial choices
attributable to “style.” For example, Holden addresses an unseen second
person (“you”). He uses slang that dates him to the 1940s and displays
noticeable verbal tics (including heavy use of the following words or
phrases: “and all,” “it really is” “It wasn’t that” “damn,” and
“goddam” [sic]). He uses hyperbole (“could’ve slept standing up)” and
anaphora (by returning to the phrase in a different form: “could’ve slept
standing up without batting an eyelash”). Lastly, he uses free indirect
discourse, or thoughts reported by the narrative voice as though
communicated directly from within the private consciousness of the
character himself (“what a rude bastard!”) Consequently, what makes
Holden unique is not the amalgam of visually evocative details that
181

SALINGER, supra note 148, at 246–49.
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characterize certain kinds of very flat characters, or that bring to life
superheroes and graphic or visual characters.
Holden’s uniqueness lies in a combination of verbal and stylistic
choices that are inextricable from the copyrightable expression
associated with Holden as a character. Copyright seeks to protect and
reward authors for their investments in characters’ development,
without crossing over into protecting authorial style and thus limiting
future authors in terms of adopting certain styles. Thus the character
entanglement problem frustrates the law’s purposes.
Indeed, how much of the work is protected under the ambit of “the
character” as differentiated from uncopyrightable style is directly
relevant to how copyright shapes the derivative work right. As such,
character entanglement could play a potentially significant role in
copyright reform with respect to literature and the scope of authors’
derivative work rights. If the law allows the scope of the character to
expand to include whatever references subsequent authors make, then
copyright law will proscribe more downstream expression even if there
would or should be a gap between use of a protected character and use
of unprotected stylistic elements from a work. Literature provides
insights that help militate against that doctrinally unjustified expansion.
III. HOW COPYRIGHT ERRS IN DECIDING WHICH CHARACTERS TO
PROTECT
Literary theories and texts help to demonstrate that the law’s
selection of characters for copyright protection is not neutral. Copyright
law thus contravenes, at least in theory, its own aesthetic nondiscrimination principle. 182 This Part shows that aesthetic decisions
about what sorts of art are worth protecting filter into character
copyright jurisprudence in three interrelated ways. 183 First, copyright
makes aesthetic determinations by protecting visual characters more
readily than literary characters. 184 Second, literature illustrates the
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2001); Yen, infra note 227, at 298.
184 It ought to be noted that in fact the very dichotomy between literary and visual is
problematic on numerous levels for literary scholars. Suffice it to say that erecting such a
barrier presupposes that literary texts are not visual when in fact the volume and quality of
scholarship on the history of the book, and the reinvigoration of the notion of the text as a
material object, strongly suggest the distinction is a false one. See, e.g., A COMPANION TO THE
HISTORY OF THE BOOK (Simon Eliot & Jonathan Rose eds., 2009); DAVID FINKELSTEIN &
ALISTAIR MCCLEERY, THE BOOK HISTORY READER (2d ed. 2010); THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
THE BOOK IN BRITAIN (2009) (which spans six volumes and more than 1,300 years of
bibliographic vicissitudes). Moreover, for scholars of manuscript even more than for scholars of
print culture and its texts, interpreting a work is deeply intertwined with the text’s visual
dimensions. See D.F. McKenzie, The Book as Expressive Form, in THE BOOK HISTORY READER,
182
183
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problems flowing from copyright’s unclear terminology: by concluding
that “word portraits” are not protectable, without a rigorous definition
of “word portrait,” the law has reified a distinction between visual and
literary media that ought never to have arisen. 185 Third, copyright
incorporates aesthetic valuation implicitly through the law’s “distinctive
delineation” standard, which encourages and rewards the creation of a
particular sort of character. Copyright law encourages and values flat
characters over round ones, despite the way that doing so aesthetically
privileges—at significant and unjustified expense—one set of literary
and cultural conceptions of character over another. Perhaps most
problematically of all, copyright law has not taken into consideration
the theoretical and empirical evidence that readers do a great deal of
work with characters when reading. In some fundamental sense, readers
can be said to “complete” characters in their minds. This view has
appeared in at least one important copyright case, and it represents a
significant body of scholarship in literature. Yet if characters can be said
to be incomplete, and to require completion by readers, it may be that
they fail to satisfy the fundamental requirement of fixation. In ignoring
the literary theories of a reader’s engagement with texts that point to
characters’ lives beyond their texts, in readers’ minds, copyright law
misses a chance to calibrate the scope of its protection as accurately as it
could.
A.

Copyright’s Preference for the Visual over the Verbal Character

A distinction between visually and verbally rendered characters,
whether justified or not, is now entrenched in copyright case law. 186 An
opinion by Judge Richard Posner affirmed the distinction between
supra, at 39 (2006) (“The persistent example of fine printing and the revival of the calligraphic
manuscript, and numerous recent studies of the sophisticated displays of text and illumination
in medieval manuscript production also share a basic assumption that [visual] form affects
sense.”).
185 The distinction between cartoon or visual characters and literary ones arises because the
earliest (pre-Nichols) cases were brought by owners of copyrights in cartoon characters. Air
Pirates then solidified the distinction, and Gaiman and other modern cases have affirmed it.
See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that its
own prior cases appearing to preclude copyright protection for literary characters did not apply
to visually depicted characters, because “a comic book character, which has physical as well as
conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of expression”); Gaiman v.
MacFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The description of a character in prose leaves
much to the imagination, even when the description is detailed . . . Even after [reading The
Maltese Falcon], one hardly knows what Sam Spade looked like. But everyone knows what
Humphrey Bogart looked like.” Posner attributed that to “the difference between literary and
graphic expression.”).
186 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 754; Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012).
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literary and visual characters emphatically. 187 The opinion is worth
sustained attention, both because it represents a number of views that
predominate in copyright, and because Judge Posner is an important
figure in American jurisprudence, indeed, especially so in the areas of
intellectual property and law and literature. 188 The passage below sets up
another important issue for copyright’s treatment of characters, which
has to do with reader reception of characters and its implications for the
fixation requirement, which the Article takes up more fully below. The
opinion, quoted below, thus makes two interventions. The first is to cast
the reader as passive when viewing images or television and active when
reading texts, which, per Posner, require a higher level of semiotic
participation. The second is to suggest that this difference in medium
thus determines, in a sense, the copyrightability of the work in question:
visual characters are more easily protected than verbal ones, which can
too easily be deemed uncopyrightable “word portraits.”
It is crucial first to understand the reader’s engagement with a
character as playing a crucial role, in Posner’s view, in differentiating the
visual and the textual. 189 He justifies the distinction thus:
The reason is the difference between literary and graphic expression.
The description of a character in prose leaves much to the
imagination, even when the description is detailed—as in Dashiell
Hammett’s description of Sam Spade’s physical appearance in the
first paragraph of The Maltese Falcon. “Samuel Spade’s jaw was long
and bony, his chin a jutting v under the more flexible v of his mouth.
His nostrils curved back to make another, smaller, v. His yellow-grey
eyes were horizontal. The v motif was picked up again by thickish
brows rising outward from twin creases above a hooked nose, and his
pale brown hair grew down—from high flat temples—in a point on
his forehead. He looked rather pleasantly like a blond satan.” Even
after all this, one hardly knows what Sam Spade looked like. But
everyone knows what Humphrey Bogart looked like. A reader of

187 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (distinguishing the Sam Spade case, even if it were good law, on
account of the “difference between literary and graphic expression”).
188 Kate O’Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner, 39 SETON
HALL L. REV. 507, 507–08 (2009) (surveying and building on the literature on why Posner’s
opinions are widely taught in the academy). On the substantiality of Posner’s substantive
contributions to these two legal areas, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); see also Teresa Huang, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right
Step in Determining Joint Authorship for Copyrighted Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 673,
693–700 (2005).
189 It is in many respects a false dichotomy, to oppose the visual and the textual. Many
textual critics pay a great deal of attention to the visually discernible aspects of a text, such as
lineation, font, pagination, binding, paper choice and quality, and so on. Zahr Kassim Said,
Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet’s Worth a Thousand Words, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 349, 354 (2013).
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unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind; the reader of a
comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive. 190

Posner’s reasoning embeds outdated assumptions about the way readers
process images and engage with imaginative content. 191 Still, Posner’s
view does map onto one set of views governing literary interpretation,
known variously as reception studies, reader response theory, or the
implied reader theory, which holds that readers create or actualize the
meanings in the texts they consume. 192 Posner’s theory of active readerly
engagement with character is thus not necessarily at odds with literary
theory. 193 However, Posner then suggests that readers of comic books
and viewers of film and television are not engaged in the way readers
are. This notion runs very much counter to contemporary media studies
and literary theories of interpretation and consumption. 194 Posner’s
view purports to explain a way in which literary characters are different
from visual characters. Yet reader response theorists would argue that
cartoon characters and other visually rendered images also require
construction and decoding by readers to deliver meanings. 195 In other
words, such theories of reception are medium-neutral.
Posner’s take on the visual/verbal distinction may also be framed in
terms of the ease with which courts can recognize infringement of visual
characters, in contrast with the difficulties attendant on substantial
similarity analysis for literary characters. 196 Other courts also reflect the
attitude expressed in Posner, that images clearly reveal infringement,
and words do not. 197 The logic implies that visual images create a kind
of short cut, from “mind to mind”; they are treated, according to one
influential view, as though they are transparent. 198 If copyright premises
Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61.
JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 62, 65–66 (1987).
192 Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 736–37 (1993).
193 Margolin, supra note 118, at 1 (“[R]eaders as readers (not as poeticians [sic]) do create
characters from texts); see also WOLFGANG ISER, THE IMPLIED READER: PATTERNS OF
COMMUNICATION IN PROSE FICTION FROM BUNYAN TO BECKETT (1974) (re-characterizing the
reader as an engaged entity who must work actively to produce the text’s meanings); HANS
ROBERT JAUSS, TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECEPTION (Timothy Bahti trans., 1982).
194 For one among many such accounts of the engaged consumer of audiovisual content, see,
e.g., FISKE, supra note 191, at 62–83 (“The audiences participate in the meanings of the
program,” and “Meanings are determined socially: that is, they are constructed out of the
conjuncture of the text with the socially situated reader.”).
195 Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 124
(2010) (“As Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and Hans Robert Jauss have variously
argued, . . . texts—such as films and television programs—[must be understood] in terms of
their own interpretation, construction, and reception [by readers (or viewers)] through an
active process of decoding and encoding.”).
196 Helfand, supra note 10, at 631.
197 Tushnet, supra note 186, at 719.
198 Id. at 686–87. Tushnet persuasively argues that courts tend to treat images in polarized
fashion:
190
191
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its protection on what are effectively mental shortcuts, however, surely it
begins trespassing on the territory of trademark, which is the proper
legal regime for protecting symbols that signify source and create
shortcuts for consumers interested in the symbol’s related goods and
services. 199
Literary theories undercut the various rationales expressed or
implied in Gaiman for distinguishing between visual and verbal
characters, and legal principles under both copyright and trademark
suggest that the distinction does not justify itself doctrinally either.
B.

Literary “Word Portraits” and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy

Literature suggests that the distinction between unprotectable
“word portraits” and protectable portraits composed of images, if
resting on nothing more, is untenable. Moreover, the distinction courts
have drawn between literary and visual representation obscures the
important work that can and must be done by the idea/expression
dichotomy. 200 At present, visual characters are deemed more readily
copyrightable than literary ones. 201 Consequently, what copyright law
terms “word portraits” of characters are not—at least in theory 202—
copyrightable. 203 The law is non-neutral because it more readily accords
protection for visual characters than for verbal ones, as is made clear in
the withholding of protection for “word portraits.” In fact, the proper
standard for copyrightability should not be the medium of rendition,
but the results of the rendition, filtered through the idea/expression
dichotomy. 204
At present, copyright law holds that what it refers to as “word
portraits” are uncopyrightable. Yet copyright law should distinguish
Copyright oscillates between two positions on nontextual creative works such as
images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque. When courts treat images as
transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary, claiming that images merely
replicate reality, so that the meaning of an image is so obvious that it admits of no
serious debate. When they treat images as opaque, they deny that interpretation is
possible, because images are so far from being susceptible to discussion and analysis
using words that there is no point in trying.
Id.

Kurtz, supra note 11, at 474.
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
201 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2004); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
202 Cf. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting District Court Hearing
(June 17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)) (describing J.D. Salinger’s Holden Caulfield as “quite delineated
by word,” “a portrait by words” and then going on to protect him as an independent character).
203 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12.
204 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
199
200
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between the “word portrait” as a generic form, and contemporary
renderings, in words, of characters, through expression that may well be
protectable even if it is verbally, rather than visually, rendered.
Copyright does not explicitly define “word portrait,” but the phrase
“word portraits,” appears in case law to be synonymous with
unprotected “ideas” rather than protected “expression.” 205 This parallel
seems mistaken, from the literary perspective, because it collapses idea
into expression. Furthermore, it incorporates an unclear, non-standard
understanding of the meaning of “word portrait.”
Literature possesses at least one form recognized to consist of a
portrait in words. Known as a “blazon” and associated with a flourishing
of late Renaissance poetry, it is a genre commonly composed of stock
images and conventional modes of describing physical features, albeit in
highly idealized, symbolic form. 206 An example of a blazon likely to be
familiar to readers is Shakespeare’s Sonnet No. 130. 207 Rather, it is more
accurate to say that it is an anti-blazon or a blazon subverting its generic
conventions. It begins: “My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the
sun;/Coral is far more red than her lips’ red./If snow be white, why then
her breasts are dun[.]” 208 Translated into legal terms, the blazon as a
generic form is uncopyrightable, under the scènes à faire doctrine. 209 In
this sense, it aligns with copyright’s vision of a “word portrait.” The
blazon is an artistic form whose rules make the prescribed elements
“indispensable” for all who would grapple with it. 210 On the one hand,
Shakespeare’s anti-blazon as a genre would similarly be
uncopyrightable: making fun of the form must be available as an option
for future authors, and “the anti-blazon” had, in any event, existed for
centuries before Shakespeare composed this one. 211 On the other hand,
the expressive details used in executing the idea of the anti-blazon, such
as comparing a lover’s bosom to the dull, dingy color of donkey hair,
might well constitute protected expression. 212

1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12.
See, e.g., Grant Williams, Disarticulating Fantasies: Figures of Speech, Vices, and the
Blazon in Renaissance English Rhetoric, 29 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 43, 46 (1999) (“[T]he blazon is
exclusively a figurative phenomenon: it is not only epitomized by a single figure . . . but also
comprised of any number of individual figures, both tropes and schemes; for instance,
metaphors, similes, synecdoches, anaphoras, isocolons, divisios, [sic] and hyperboles, to name
but a few.”).
207 JONATHAN BATE, THE GENIUS OF SHAKESPEARE 52 (1998) (describing the blazon as a
genre in which the lover “enumerate[s] the beauties of their beloved from top to toe”).
208 THE NORTON SHAKESPEARE (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997).
209 Kurtz, supra note 57, at 108, 114.
210 Id. at 91.
211 BATE, supra note 207, at 52.
212 Dun Definition, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/dun (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (defining “dun,” an adjective, as “of a dull
grayish-brown color”).
205
206
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Literature highlights the limits of copyright’s understanding of the
“word portrait.” Compare, for example, the operation of an
(uncopyrightable) blazon (as a generic vehicle for praising the idealized
form of the beloved through a collage of conventional metaphors and
images) to a contemporary description of a character from a bestselling
novel, Stieg Larsson’s The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo. 213
[She] was a pale, anorexic young woman who had hair as short as a
fuse, and a pierced nose and eyebrows. She had a wasp tattoo about
an inch long on her neck, a tattooed loop around the biceps of her
left arm and another around her left ankle. On those occasions when
she had been wearing a tank top, Armansky also saw that she had a
dragon tattoo on her left shoulder blade. She was a natural redhead,
but she dyed her hair raven black. She looked as though she had just
emerged from a week-long orgy with a gang of hard rockers. . . . She
had simply been born thin, with slender bones that made her look
girlish and fine-limbed with small hands, narrow wrists, and childlike
breasts. She was twenty-four, but she sometimes looked fourteen. She
had a wide mouth, a small nose, and high cheekbones that gave her
an almost Asian look. Her movements were quick and spidery, and
when she was working at the computer her fingers flew over the
keys. . . . Sometimes she wore black lipstick, and in spite of the
tattoos
and
the
pierced
nose
and
eyebrows
she
was . . . well . . . attractive. 214

It would be difficult to claim that the portrayal above is not
“distinctively delineated” under a range of possible meanings for that
phrase. Notice, however, that proclaiming Lisbeth distinctively
delineated as a character does little to distinguish idea from expression
as copyright law requires; it merely presumes the existence of a dividing
line, somewhere. Concededly, the line-drawing required by the
dichotomy presents significant difficulty, as others have noted.
Nonetheless, no test or tool has superseded it yet. 215 The character
described above can be framed as a broad idea (young sexy female punk
who has a job) which would provide a broader scope of protection
against subsequent uses, 216 or as a narrowly drawn idea (countercultural young female detective/hacker with puckish sexuality who
defies professional and societal expectations), which would provide
narrower future protection for the work since many of its expressive
elements could arguably fall around the very specifically tailored “idea”
at the heart of the work. The passage above clearly possesses some
STIEG LARSSON, THE GIRL WITH THE DRAGON TATTOO (Reg Keeland trans., 2008).
Id. at 32.
215 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
216 The broader the idea animating a given work, the more of the work can conceivably be
deemed copyrightable expression. In turn, proportionately less of the work will be
presumptively available for downstream users.
213
214
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protected expression, even if the scope of that protection is subject to
debate; determining how much protection is part of the difficult but
constitutionally required work for judges adjudicating copyright
decisions. 217 Unlike the blazon, it grounds its figure not, for the most
part, 218 in figurative language and symbols (such as the sun and coral) 219
but in concrete markers (such as specific tattoos, hair color, bone
structure, and numerous other precisely tailored details). It might be
called a very “visual” description for a literary character.
Copyright law should dispense with the unclear terminology of the
“word portrait” and instead focus attention on the idea/expression
dichotomy. Literary descriptions of character, mistakenly termed “word
portraits,” should be considered through copyright’s idea/expression
analysis, just as any other rendering of an artistic character is. Indeed,
the Copyright Act requires this sort of filtering as between protected and
unprotected elements of expressive works. 220
In light of literary traditions and theories, the law’s distinction
between visual and literary characters should not be maintained.
Whether the rationale is ease of evidentiary process (and the imagined
transparency of images)221 or aesthetic preference (for graphically
rendered or visually evocative characters), the result is the same. If the
incentives theory of copyright protection is accurate—and scholarship
and law both behave as though it is—the law incentivizes the creation of
characters that, though rendered in words, consist of descriptions that
are as graphic or as visually evocative as possible. 222 In other words,
authors who create literary renderings of character that leave very little
to the imagination would, under the Posner rationale stated above,
merit stronger protection of their characters, because these figures
would be more like visually rendered characters than like “word
portraits.” Copyright scholarship has yet to take stock of what this may
217 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Alfred C. Yen,
A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s
“Total Concept and Feel”, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 400 (1989).
218 The passage contains some figurative language, including: the similes “hair short as a
fuse,” and the phrase “[s]he looked as though she had just emerged from a week-long orgy,”
and the metaphor of “spidery” movement. Nonetheless, the dominant mode of discourse here
is not figurative but quite concretely grounded. LARSON, supra note 213, at 32.
219 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing Shakespeare’s Sonnet No. 130,
which embeds figurative language drawing on images of the sun and coral).
220 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
221 Tushnet, supra note 186, at 686–87.
222 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (dismissing
the argument that copyright necessarily restricts First Amendment freedoms, because copyright
is itself responsible for incentivizing the creation of a considerable amount of speech); see also
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483, 606–27 (1996); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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imply for literary production. The next Part argues that these incentives
translate into privileging one aesthetic mode over another and could
lead to the creation of flat, rather than round, characters.
C.

Characters in Search of a Neutral Copyrightability Standard

The distinctive delineation standard set out in Nichols skews
protection towards a particular kind of artistic production that, in
theoretical terms, could be said to privilege the visual, and the flat, over
the verbal, and the round. 223 Indeed, the very phrase “distinctive
delineation,” first introduced in Nichols, contains within it hints of
copyright’s valorization of the visual over the literary discussed in the
previous Part: the idea of delineation comes not from verbal creation
but from the realm of drawing or painting, and means to create by
drawing lines. 224 Yet the distinctive delineation test moves beyond mere
preference for the visual. It encourages and rewards literature that
features characters that are easy to recognize as “distinctive,” and thus
much likelier to be flat characters rather than round. To understand the
aesthetic implications of the distinctive delineation test, it is important
first to grasp the role it plays in copyright opinions.
Copyright infringement analysis generally features two stages
(assuming plaintiffs have proven ownership of a valid copyright).
Plaintiffs must first show copying. 225 Plaintiffs must then prove that the
copying was impermissible, that is, that defendants not only copied, but
copied material that was protectable. 226 Copyright infringement analysis
with respect to independent characters proceeds along two further

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
Deliniation
Definition,
ACADEMIC
DICTIONARIES
AND
ENCYCLOPEDIAS,
http://useful_english.enacademic.com/35244/delineation (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (The first
definition for “delineation” provides: “The action of tracing out something by lines; the
drawing of a diagram, geometrical figure, etc.; . . . a drawing, diagram, or figure.” The second
and third definitions establish even more strongly the visual nature of delineation’s mode of
representation. They state, respectively: “The action of tracing in outline something to be
constructed; a sketch, outline, plan, rough draft. Usually fig.” and “The action or manner of
representing an object by a drawing or design; pictorial representation, portraiture; . . . a
portrait, likeness, picture.”).
225 Proof of copying may be provided through direct evidence, or through the presumption
of copying which arises if plaintiffs can prove (1) that defendants had access to the copied work
and took advantage of that access, and (2) that the works in question are “substantially similar.”
Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The issue of
copying can be broken down into two subissues. The first is whether the alleged copier had
access to the work that he is claimed to have copied; the second is whether, if so, he used his
access to copy.”).
226 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1977) (“The real task in a copyright infringement action . . . is to determine whether there
has been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself.”).
223
224
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tiers. 227 First, the court inquires whether the character was
copyrightable. 228 Under the Nichols test, once characters are deemed
sufficiently expressive to be “distinctively delineated,” they may be
copyrightable apart from the works that surround them. 229 Second, the
court asks whether the defendant copied the protected aspects of the
character’s expression, or “merely a broader and more abstract
outline.” 230
One way of viewing the threshold inquiry into character
copyrightability is as an example of the idea/expression dichotomy in
action. 231 A second way of seeing this test is as a regrettable diversion
from the matter at hand: the focus on the character’s copyrightability
and “distinctiveness” shifts attention away from the copying analysis,
where attention properly belongs. 232 A third way of seeing it is as the
law’s imposition of an aesthetic requirement to qualify for copyright
protection. 233 The first and second views seem right, but they are
insufficient. 234 The third view arguably reveals the problem behind the
“distinctively delineated” standard: it masks evaluative work that
necessarily takes place in the course of its determination. In other
words, the test offers a legal conclusion posing as a standard, and
incorporates aesthetic preferences without doing so explicitly.
The distinctive delineation test is an unclear and subjective one
that leads to conclusory legal analysis. Perhaps because courts do not
know how to implement a standard like this, characters are often simply

227 This analysis operates apart from the prior analysis of whether the work as a whole was
(a) copied and (b) copied impermissibly. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic
Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (describing substantial similarity analysis at the first stage
of proving copying).
228 Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (1988).
229 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). No court has relied
solely on Sam Spade’s “constitutes the story being told” test.
230 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12.
231 See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 (“As Malvolio’s analogue (with a different name) was
moved through different surroundings and episodes, the pattern common to both characters
would tend to describe only a stock figure, ‘idea’ not ‘expression . . . .’”); see also MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(reasoning that under Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121, “copyright protection is granted to a character if
it is developed with enough specificity so as to constitute protectable expression”).
232 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12; Kurtz, supra note 11, at 927.
233 Helfand, supra note 10, at 631 (“Determining whether a character is ‘sufficiently
delineated’ to be eligible for copyright protection involves, in effect, assessing the character’s
‘inherent worth.’”).
234 If character copyrightability were merely about the idea/expression dichotomy, it would
be unnecessary. Thus something else is needed to account for its tenacity in the case law. Kurtz
and Nimmer may be right in commenting that character copyrightability is a diversion, but so
long as courts continue to engage in it, its implications bear considering.

SAID.35.2 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

12/17/2013 9:47 AM

FIXING COPYRIGHT IN CHARACTERS

815

declared to be highly delineated with little argument or evidentiary
support, along these lines: 235
Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his
jungle environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to
experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent, youthful,
gentle and strong. He is Tarzan. 236

The description hardly amounts to a carefully reasoned legal finding, 237
though the court did conclude that Tarzan was copyrightable. 238
Again and again, the distinctive delineation test produces
inconsistent, aesthetically non-neutral results. 239 The alternative, the
constitutes-the-story-being-told test has little power as a meaningful
alternative, despite never having been overruled. 240 Thus the distinctive
delineation test ends up playing an important role in determinations of
235

The Rocky characters are one of the most highly delineated group [sic] of characters
in modern American cinema. The physical and emotional characteristics of Rocky
Balboa and the other characters were set forth in tremendous detail in the three
Rocky movies before Anderson appropriated the characters for his treatment. The
interrelationships and development of Rocky, Adrian, Apollo Creed, Clubber Lang,
and Paulie are central to all three movies. Rocky Balboa is such a highly delineated
character that his name is the title of all four of the Rocky movies and his character
has become identified with specific character traits ranging from his speaking
mannerisms to his physical characteristics. This Court has no difficulty ruling as a
matter of law that the Rocky characters are delineated so extensively that they are
protected from bodily appropriation when taken as a group and transposed into a
sequel by another author. Plaintiff has not and cannot put before this Court any
evidence to rebut the defendants’ showing that Rocky characters are so highly
delineated that they warrant copyright protection.
Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
Note that the court points only to producers’ decision to title the films after the character, and
to his “specific character traits” such as “speaking mannerisms [to his] physical characteristics.”
Id. At this level of generality, the court’s statements seem far more conclusory than carefully
reasoned. Even if they could have pointed to details to prove the matter asserted—Rocky’s
“highly delineated” status—the Anderson court did not feel the need to do so.
236 Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 683
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
237 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 458. Kurtz elaborated,
Nothing in this description indicates why Tarzan was distinctively delineated. The
description is of little more than a type. Surely another author could write a noninfringing story about an individual in tune with a jungle environment and able to
communicate with animals, who is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle, and strong.
Indeed, the description seems to fit Kipling’s Mowgli as well as Tarzan. The court’s
difficulty in explaining why Tarzan was distinctively delineated illustrates the
problem inherent in attempting to make such a determination without comparing
the characters in the allegedly infringed and infringing works.
Id.

238 Burroughs, 519 F. Supp. at 391 (“It is beyond cavil that the character ‘Tarzan’ is
delineated in a sufficiently distinctive fashion to be copyrightable.”).
239 See, e.g., Brylawski, supra note 15, at 77; Kurtz, supra note 11, at 456.
240 Id.
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the fact and scope of independent copyright protection. In case after
case pertaining to copyright in characters, aesthetic determinations
necessarily take place on or below the surface, despite the well-settled
principle that courts should not assess aesthetic value in the course of
copyright adjudication. 241 These aesthetic valuations are sometimes
outcome-determinative. Theoretically, copyright law is premised on the
notion that aesthetic neutrality is necessary, possible, and good. 242 Yet
the reality does not play out that way, as scholarship has noted, in an
effort to begin to evaluate the theoretical consequences of nonneutrality for artistic production. 243
The problem of inartful application of the distinctive delineation
test arose again in recent litigation. 244 J.D. Salinger (and his estate, after
he died during litigation) brought suit over an unauthorized sequel to
Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, called Sixty Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye, by “J.D. California” (the pseudonym of SwedishAmerican author Fredrik Colting). The sequel starred a fictionalized
version of Salinger himself and an aged version of Salinger’s Holden
Caulfield, the protagonist from The Catcher in the Rye and arguably one
of the most iconic literary figures of the twentieth century. 245 The lower
court found the subsequent work infringing of its source work, and
issued a preliminary injunction barring the sequel from distribution in
the United States. 246 In finding Caulfield protectable, the lower court
jumbled the copyright doctrine:
Holden Caulfield is quite delineated by word. It is a portrait by
words. 247 It is something that is obviously seen to be of value since
the effort is made [by defendants] to recall everything that the
character in the book does . . . It is difficult, in fact, to separate
Holden Caulfield from the book. 248

The court in Salinger I found Holden “quite delineated,” suggesting
itself to be on the way to a finding of copyrightability under its
articulation of the Nichols test, though without reasoning its way

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Id. at 251; cf. Yen, supra note 227, at 248.
243 See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L. REV. 175, 231–32 (1990);
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1232 (1997); Yen,
supra note 227, at 248.
244 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
245 Menand, infra note 256.
246 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73. The Second Circuit reversed on procedural grounds, but noted
with approval the Southern District’s copyright analysis.
247 Id. An additional point of confusion that undermines confidence in the court’s
reasoning: it identified Holden as a “portrait by words,” which sounds like the “word portrait”
that under copyright has historically not been protectable. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12.
248 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73 (quoting District Court Hearing (June 17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)).
241
242
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through to its conclusion. 249 The court then implied that Holden’s value
derives from Colting’s decision to appropriate Holden. That is, the
choice to copy, and the number of Holden’s actions copied, served as
the measure of whether Holden was sufficiently distinctively delineated
for protection. Clearly, this circular reasoning does not provide a proper
measure of a character’s protectability. 250 That the court should conclude
delineation based on a character’s market value or artistic interest to
downstream authors, rather than reasoning its way towards a sound
analysis of copyrightability, may suggest the difficulty of the
copyrightability determination for independent characters. Based on
this and other similarly conclusory case law, then, it would be difficult to
develop a formula for arriving at distinctive delineation, which, in turn,
poses a problem for those who wish to use preexisting characters in new
works.
By and large, copyright law and scholarship assume that incentives
matter to authors, and following thereon, will take copyright law into
account when making artistic decisions. Because the law is presupposed
to create meaningful incentives for creators, we can assume, at least
arguendo, that creators may create so as to optimize their copyright
protection. If this is so, the distinctive delineation test will skew
characters in the direction of distinctiveness that is easily perceived,
which the case law suggests is truer of visual than verbal characters. 251
Lisbeth Salander, the tattooed cyber-sleuth mentioned above,
might be an overdetermined example of the way contemporary
literature offers up very visually detailed characters. 252 Yet it sets up a
249

2010).

Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.

250 Litman, supra note 17, at 429 (stating that merely because something is copied does not
make it valuable). Otherwise, as a matter of logic, copyright would collapse the idea/expression
analysis: merely because something had been taken, it would make it protectable. Thus
anything borrowed would be de facto infringing, as a default. Clearly, copyright law could not
be correctly construed to reach that result.
251 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
252 Another, perhaps more convincing parallel exists in the transition from the “vermin”
Gregor Samsa becomes in Franz Kafka’s story (vermin being, apparently, the most authoritative
English translation of Kafka’s original “ungeziefer”) to Gregor Samsa’s appearance in a later
adaptation of the story, Marc Estrin’s Insect Dreams. Per Kafka:

When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning from unsettling dreams, he found
himself changed in his bed into a monstrous vermin. He was lying on his back as
hard as armor plate, and when he lifted his head a little, he saw his vaulted brown
belly, sectioned by arch-shaped ribs, to whose dome the cover, about to slide off
completely, could barely cling. His many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of
the rest of him, were waving helplessly before his eyes.
FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS 3 (Stanley Corngold trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1996)
(footnotes omitted). Estrin’s vermin:
He was five feet, six inches from the top of his head to the tip of his tegmina, not
counting his cerci, which, because of the need to wear clothing, were most often
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helpful parallel nonetheless. Consider her in juxtaposition with
Salinger’s Holden Caulfield. By contrast with Lisbeth Salander, Holden
Caulfield is much more difficult to fix in the mind’s eye 253 in the way
Posner imagines readers doing with cartoon characters in Gaiman. 254
Holden is not a character easily recognizable in a paragraph’s visually
descriptive language. Very few physical details characterize Salinger’s
depiction of him. Readers learn of a red hunting hat to which Holden
grows attached, and which he keeps folded in his pocket, but very little
else makes Holden visually distinctive. 255 He could have been played, in
a film version, by James Dean, or James Franco, or James Spader,
without a reader’s protesting, on the basis of textual evidence, that the
film had failed to cast Holden faithfully.
Holden Caulfield is round. He is an extraordinarily memorable
character, 256 but what makes him unique arguably has less to do with the
amount of imagination needed to conjure him, or the number of
concrete details associated with his looks, and more to do with the
iconoclastic tenor of his moods, his laconic dialogue, and his sardonic
strapped to his abdomen underneath. . . . His most striking features—the most
upsetting, at least to strangers—were his eyes, two huge compound eyes, seven inches
across, of two thousand lenses each. In the faintest light they would glisten,
iridescent, ever-changing. Vision for those with compound eyes is both less—and
more—exact than for those of us with mammalian organs. While the overall image
was somewhat blurry, a mosaic of soft focus like the surface of a Seurat, his
perception of motion was vastly more acute. . . . so his peripheral vision was
immense. . . . His mouth was far more adept than our own, with hard, chitinous jaws
for chewing from side to side, maxillae with both soft and stiff bristles for
grooming . . . His ears, so to speak, were subgenual organs located in each knee
joint . . . .
MARC ESTRIN, INSECT DREAMS: THE HALF-LIFE OF GREGOR SAMSA 11–12 (2002). The emphasis
on greater visual perception and the translation of his experience into visual terms through
reference to a Seurat painting may suggest a number of reasons for which characters may be
more visually rendered now (in Estrin) than then (in Kafka). This has nothing or little to do
with copyright law, and more to do with modernity, shifts in readers’ taste and artistic
techniques, a greater interest in phenomenological narrative, etc. But it does not disprove the
argument that characters may often find expression in more visually vivid and detailed ways
than they once did, and that copyright consequences may flow from that increased attention to
the visual.
253 Cf. Jennifer Paull, J.D. Salinger Style—Tipping Our Hats to Holden Caulfield, STYLELIST
(Jan. 19, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.stylelist.com/2010/01/29/j-d-salinger-style-tipping-ourhats-to-holden-caulfield (“Caulfield, the narrator of Salinger’s novel “The Catcher in the Rye” is
such a vivid character that you can practically hear, smell and touch him.”).
254 Cf. Posner’s discussion of the reader’s engagement with literary versus visual characters,
in Gaiman, discussed supra note 57 and accompanying text.
255 SALINGER, supra note 148, at 17 (“It was this red hunting hat, with one of those very, very
long peals. I saw it in the window of this sports store when we got out of the subway, just after I
noticed I’d lost all the goddam foils. It only cost me a buck. The way I wore it, I swung the old
peak way around to the back—very corny, I’ll admit but I liked it that way, I looked good in it
that way.”).
256 Louis Menand, Holden at Fifty: “The Catcher in the Rye” and What It Spawned, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 82.
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interior monologue. 257 In particular, his sensitivity to artifice and
“phoniness” of almost any kind marks him as very particularized. 258
These, however, are not elements easily separated from the text itself, as
shown in the discussion above, at pages 31-32. To the extent that they
can be grouped into categories, it is not clear why Holden’s traits make
him something other than an unprotectable word portrait. Holden’s
conceptual characteristics make him “round” in ways that have attracted
hundreds of articles, scores of books, and millions of readers. 259 Yet
these qualities are harder to muster in concise textual evidence and
harder to separate from the text for the purposes of infringement
analysis. Perhaps for these reasons, the court made a point of citing to
articles on how culturally important Holden had become, almost as if
preempting critiques of its cursory copyrightability analysis. 260 In light
of its own copyright standards, the law should not have found it so easy
to protect Holden independently of The Catcher in the Rye. 261
Copyright’s standards of independent character protection make it
easier to protect flat than round characters.
The implications of copyright’s valorization of flat characters are
especially troubling in light of the incentives theory of copyright. The
visual nature of Stieg Larsson’s description of the eponymous “girl with
the dragon tattoo” in words could be attributable to a number of factors,
aesthetic, cultural, legal, or otherwise. For instance, Larsson may have
anticipated the film’s development into a film; much popular literature
styles itself as though screenplay-ready. 262 Indeed, the novel feels filmic
in many respects, not just in its descriptions of character. 263 He may
257 Posner may have been correct in asserting that some literary characters leave more to the
imagination than others, but the juxtaposition of Holden and Lisbeth calls into question
whether it is right to accord greater protection on the basis of this difference.
258 Duane Edwards, Holden Caulfield Suffers from Unresolved Sexual Conflict, in
DEPRESSION IN J.D. SALINGER’S THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 89 (Dedria Bryfonski ed., 2009)
(“What does make him extraordinary is his special ability to detect phoniness everywhere
(except in himself).”).
259 Menand, supra note 256.
260 Indeed, one might say that the court adjudicated the matter as though Holden were, by
analogy, a trademark, a thing whose fame did actually matter in determining the way the law
should proceed.
261 Recall that, absent independent copyright protection, Holden would be protectable
insofar as he is synonymous with the text: subsequent authors’ uses would be measured against
whether the text (not Holden as a character) had been impermissibly copied.
262 Zahr K. Said, Novels for Hire (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
263 I have in mind the way the narrative feels cinematic in its cuts between scenes, and in its
attention to details of framing scenes visually, as though imagining them as tableaux or
storyboards. There are also numerous brands mentioned with regularity, which I have argued
elsewhere is often a signal to sponsors and audiovisual producers of a literary work’s
adaptability for the screen. Id. at 36 (“Placing brands in literature need not be motivated by
formal sponsorship agreements because such authors may embed brands so as to make it easy
to convert their literary works into viable screenplays or tv scripts for which it then becomes
easy to secure sponsors’ involvement. Sponsors can see their name in literary lights and
determine ahead of time whether they will like the role created for their brand.”).
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have used such expressive and detailed language to emphasize Lisbeth
Salander’s difference from earlier literary detectives and signal his
subversion of the generic conventions of detective fiction. Or he might
have done so to maximize the amount of independent copyright
protection she would receive as a character, against subsequent uses.
While this last explanation is, intuitively, the most farfetched, it aligns
with copyright scholarship’s treatment of authors as economic actors.
Indeed: copyright’s dominant discourse today is arguably utilitarian,
and it relies on the incentives theory as a justification. 264 If scholars
continue to take the incentives theory of copyright seriously, they must
consider that this is one possible outcome of the distinctive delineation
test: the characters that will be created will display “physical” rather than
“conceptual” qualities, and will be characters that can be most easily
imagined in concrete terms. 265 Creating flat characters is arguably much
easier than creating round ones. 266 Had Salinger conceived of Holden so
as to maximize his copyright protection in him, he might well have
ended up much less intricate and emotionally compelling to the
generations who have followed. He might have ended up more
caricature than character.
Literature draws attention to the fact and impact of copyright’s
protection of characters that are flat rather than round. 267 Though the
court found Holden, a round character, copyrightable, it did violence to
copyright analysis in so finding. The distinctively delineated standard
skews protection for characters who exhibit characteristics more
common to popular literature, suggesting a bias against other modes of
representation, such as “conceptual,” psychologically complex, or round
characters. 268 While flat characters are important in their own right, they
ought not to receive favored treatment under copyright law. 269
In conclusion, both the preference for visual over literary
characters outlined in Parts III.A and III.B and the “distinctive
delineation” test push literary production in the direction of being as
visually memorable as possible, even if characters are to be rendered
solely through words. Copyright law’s protection for characters imports
aesthetic preferences for particular kinds of characters in several discrete
ways. The preference for visual over verbal works is unjustified, and the
264 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746
(2012).
265 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978).
266 JAMES WOOD, HOW FICTION WORKS 96 (2008) (describing the tendency to portray
characters in flat, lifeless manner: “The unpracticed novelist cleaves to the static, because it is so
much easier to describe than the mobile: it is getting these people out of the aspic of arrest and
mobilized in a scene that is hard.”).
267 FORSTER, supra note 95, at 103–04.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 108.
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terminology used to express that preference (“word portraits”) is
unclear and misguided. Further, the “distinctive delineation”
requirement for independent character protection creates incentives for
characters that will skew towards a particular aesthetic and will result—
at least in theory—in the creation of characters that are more flat than
round. It may be that copyright should revisit Bleistein’s aesthetic nondiscrimination principle as part of a systematic reform of the scope and
purpose of the derivative work right, where it does (or claims to do) a
great deal of work. 270 Unless and until such review transpires, however,
literature helps illuminate the ways in which copyright law overtly and
subtly encourages the creation of particular forms of artistic creation
despite its claim to aesthetic neutrality.
D.

Acknowledging the Fixation Hurdle

Judge Posner’s view in Gaiman suggests that literary images admit
of a number of different modes of recognition with respect to characters;
they are unstable signs. To put it in semiotic terms, literary characters,
under the Posner view, offer textual signifieds whose signifiers may be
quite mobile or allow a great deal of “play.” A number of different
actors, after all, have played James Bond, and in so doing they prove that
the literary James Bond whom Ian Fleming created can and must
conjure one image (indeed many images) for his readers, while the
visually rendered “Bonds” are merely additional, permissible visual
interpretations (signifiers) of the literary signified. 271
Indeed, Posner’s view of characters as requiring interpretation or
completion by readers suggests legal arguments that could arise under
copyright apart from literary theories, though the two strands of
scholarship intersect here. If the literary character must, in fact, be
conjured up by the reader mentally, one might say the character has, in

270 Yen, supra note 227, at 253, 266–97 (arguing that courts should take explicit stock of
aesthetic judgments made in the process of copyright infringement determinations).
271 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal.
1995). Alternatively, one might argue that in our culture, the immediacy of the film James Bond
has overshadowed the literary one, and that the semiotic systems are now separate but
complementary. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 68 (2008) (“It is through text that we elites communicate (look at you,
reading this book). For the masses, however, most information is gathered through other forms
of media: TV, film, music, and music video. These forms of ‘writing’ are the vernacular of
today. They are the kinds of ‘writing’ that matters most to most.”). In that case, one might say
that the Bond films create, all together a single signified (this was the argument in Anderson v.
Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989)). Various
different actors from Roger Moore to Daniel Craig then incarnate the role, becoming the
changing signifiers that embody the signified afresh with each new casting decision.
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a deeper sense, never met copyright’s fixation requirement. 272 That the
verbal rendering, in words, has been fixed, is of course not in
question. 273 Its career in the world of ideas and culture, however,
depends if not on its “semiotic disobedience,” at least on its semiotic
autonomy, its very lack of conceptual fixation. 274 If Posner’s theory of
character completion is pursued to its logical conclusion, literary
characters (and any characters requiring mental completion by those
who perceive them) should perhaps be viewed as not properly “fixed”
for the purposes of copyright protection, and thus not independently
copyrightable. 275 The very existence in both law and literature of two
ways to approach the texts at issue—external and internal, in literary
terms; extrinsic and intrinsic, in legal terms—further implies the work
done subjectively in the course of apprehending characters. 276 There is
no one natural way to “read” a character. Thus a verbally rendered
character might be fixed in words as part of a literary text that is
copyrightable as a text. However, that text’s character might be said to
lack the necessary fixation to qualify for independent copyright
protection since how a reader interprets the verbal text to produce a
mental image of that character is largely particular to the reader, and not
fixed anywhere.
Recall that a threshold requirement for copyright protection is that
a work be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”277 To be
considered “fixed,” a work must be “sufficiently permanent or
stable . . . to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.” 278 Complex issues arise when
a work is fixed in only fleeting fashion, or when a work changes, as a
part of its nature or design. For example, in their earliest days, computer
games posed a doctrinal puzzle: were ephemeral audiovisual displays
272 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” (emphasis added)).
273 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (“Under
the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—whether
it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia,
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched,
magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means
of any machine or device ‘now known or later developed.’”).
274 Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489 (2006).
275 Indeed, under one literary view of characters, making any meaning at all out of
characters requires acts of interpretation and relies on “the audience’s accustomed expectations
regarding components of a narrative,” which suggests that in fact characters achieve their fullest
signification only in the minds of readers and viewers. Ira Newman, Virtual People: Fictional
Characters through the Frames of Reality, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 73, 75–76 (2009).
276 Id. at 75; see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
277 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
278 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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produced by videogames not copyrightable because they failed to satisfy
the fixation requirement? 279 In Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic
International, Inc., the Third Circuit answered that question in the
negative, holding that the audiovisual displays of video games were
protected under the 1976 Copyright Act. 280
Yet the court’s reasoning emphasized that it was the repetitive
nature of these transient displays that led it to conclude that they were
“sufficiently permanent or stable . . . to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for more than [a] . . . transitory” period. 281
Similarly, in Stern Electronics, it was the “repetitive sequence of images”
that led to a finding of sufficient fixation to justify copyright
protection. 282 In some sense, these courts turned to repetitiveness as a
proxy for fixation; the displays recurred with sufficient regularity that
they might as well have been considered fixed. Put another way, one
could conclude that these images were constructively fixed.
The courts in Stern and Williams were not troubled by the fact that
these products were ones designed to change to some degree every
single time the games were played, because the displays were changing
from game to game only very little, if at all. The emphasis was on
repetition and predictability. By contrast, in a more recent copyright
decision, a court decided the issue of whether a work of art could be said
to be fixed given that it had been designed with awareness and
expectation of the work’s undergoing subsequent changes. The work
was a garden designed by Chapman Kelley for the city of Chicago. Kelley
v. Chicago Park District raised the question of whether a garden can be
considered a work of authorship, and, whether it can properly be
considered fixed. 283 At issue there was also whether the garden was a
“visual work” for the purposes of VARA (the Visual Artists Rights Acts)
or a copyrightable sculpture, or possibly neither. 284 Yet the Court backed
away from the VARA claim by insisting that the garden was not
copyrightable ab initio. The Seventh Circuit resolved the case largely on
the fixation point, holding that a garden could not be deemed to have
been fixed because the garden’s elements were “alive and inherently
changeable, not fixed.” That is, the garden would change based on forces
of nature beyond the artist’s control or intention. The court discussed
this changeability in some detail, stating that the garden’s
appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline for
determining questions of copyright creation and infringement. If a
279
280
281
282
283
284

Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 874.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982).
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 291–92.
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garden can qualify as a “work of authorship” sufficiently “embodied
in a copy,” at what point has fixation occurred? When the garden is
newly planted? When its first blossoms appear? When it is in full
bloom? How—and at what point in time—is a court to determine
whether infringing copying has occurred? 285

For the Seventh Circuit, it was important that the forces of nature could
and did have a significant impact on the work’s ability to remain in its
original state, and again, the opinion is worth quoting at length:
Of course, the forces of nature—the varying bloom periods of the
plants; their spread habits, compatibility, and life cycles; and the
weather—produced constant change. Some wildflowers naturally did
better than others. Some spread aggressively and encroached on
neighboring plants. Some withered and died. Unwanted plants
sprung up from seeds brought in by birds and the wind. Insects,
rabbits, and weeds settled in, eventually taking a toll. 286

Unlike the audiovisual displays in Williams, the changing, unfixed
aspects of the work were not ones that were repetitive and predictable
over time. Here, parts of the original work actually did not survive while
others thrived and changed shape and size.
The Kelley opinion is well-reasoned and nuanced. Yet its
implications are potentially considerable. It suggests that other works
that also, by their nature, change after the author has created them, may
not meet copyright’s fixation requirement. 287
Under Kelley, it is possible to argue that though a novel’s text is
clearly fixed, its characters, beyond their expression as a mere collection
of words, are not fixed. Characters, like a garden’s blooms, undergo
“constant change” in the minds of readers. As the Kelley court put it:
“gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed.”288
Characters—though clearly authored—are themselves in a deeper sense
both “alive and inherently changeable.”
The analogy between a novel’s characters and a garden design’s
physical expression is not perfectly apposite, but it suggests some
commonalities that could help clarify copyright in characters. Like
characters in a novel, the garden in its final artistic state was one that
continued to evolve over time, in unpredictable ways. Its origins, like
those of characters, were fixed. A character’s origins lie in a novel
comprising the author’s fixed expression of a variety of authorial
influences, ideas, and experiences. The character’s text is fixed. Yet the
things created by the text—perceptions and memories in the minds of
285
286
287
288

Id. at 305.
Id. at 294.
HOWARD ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 2:27 (2012).
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304.
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readers—the way the characters are brought to life by readers, those are
not and cannot be fixed. Recall the neuroscientist’s description of
reading: characters run “on minds of readers just as computer
simulations run on computers.” 289
Similarly, the garden’s final state exists only because of its origins
in a design that was fixed in a drawing or set of plans. That design or
drawing may have reflected both copyrightable aspects and
noncopyrightable aspects (such as what sorts of flowers can grow in
what kinds of conditions; or where the light is strongest in parts of the
park; these are facts, and not copyrightable creative expression). Yet the
design is clearly a work distinct from the garden just as the book of
accounting forms in Baker v. Selden was a distinct (and copyrightable)
work even though the underlying accounting system was not
copyrightable. That design was then executed in three dimensions in the
actual physical space the garden would occupy. Upon the garden’s
completion, from the time it was subject to external forces such as
weather, other flora, and fauna, it lost any claim to being fixed because it
became subject to change that would not be repetitive and predictable.
Just as, per Robert Frost’s poem, “nothing gold can stay,” no garden will
stay in its original designed form unless it is rigorously policed for
change. 290 Gardens grow, and growth is the antithesis of fixedness.
Yet the militant horticultural grooming necessary to prevent
change to a garden marks the end of the usefulness of the analogy
between a garden’s changing blooms and a novel’s evolving characters.
It would be not only impossible to guard against changes to characters,
it would make novels incomprehensible. Characters can live in readers’
minds only because readers take them and internalize them and make
them their own.
In her work on characters in literary theory, Suzanne Keen has
advocated for greater reliance on reader response theory and greater
engagement with actual readers in terms of their emotional engagement.
Keen shows that very little is needed in terms of character clues to begin
a process of engagement from which readers imagine and complete
their characters, in a process she describes as “the gap-filling fantasizing
by which most readers flesh out fictional characters from scant verbal
cues.” 291 By that same token, readers will experience a range of
heterogeneous responses when they make affective judgments about
characters: they “will make a variety of judgments about the same
fictional character: some will find a character more whole, while others
will see a fragmented figure; some will make a case for a stylized,
Paul, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ROBERT FROST, Nothing Gold Can Stay, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: COLLECTED
POEMS 222 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 2002).
291 Keen, supra note 5, at 308.
289
290
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symbolic reading, while others recognize a natural, literal rendering of
the very same character.” 292 Keen’s view builds, of course, on the
theoretical foundations of reader response theory, which was the school
of literary studies responsible for shifting focus onto the reader as an
agent of textual interpretation. The insights from reader response theory
make sense of how it could be that different readers can have such
different experiences reading the same text, by suggesting that readers
engage in a heterogeneous textual process of meaning making. 293
In short, readers do a lot of work to make characters make sense
for themselves. A cynical (or theoretically outmoded) view of characters
is that they are merely mimetic structures that reflect humans’ base
desires to see themselves. 294 They thrive on our recognition and they
cater to our narcissism. Hélène Cixous writes:
By definition, a “character,” preconceived or created by an author, is
to be figured out, understood, read: he is presented, offered up to
interpretation, with the prospect of a traditional reading that seeks its
satisfaction at the level of a potential identification with such and
such a “personage,” the reader entering into commerce with the book
on condition that he be assured of getting paid back, that is,
recompensed by another who is sufficiently similar to or different
from him—such that the reader is upheld, by comparison or in
combination with a personage, in the representation that he wishes
to have of himself. 295

Whether that view, rooted in psychoanalytical analysis, tells the right
story about the work readers do in making their characters, it is
certainly right in its point that characters do require some decoding and
some recognition on the part of their readers. That readerly work turns
out, just as Judge Posner’s intuition in Gaiman hinted, to hold
important insights for copyright law.
The distinction between characters fixed in a copyrightable text
and characters in their post-textual afterlife is not simply academic. In
the case of the latter, independent copyright protection should not
attach because characters would seem to fail to satisfy copyright’s
fixation requirement. In turn, the fixation requirement is no mere
formality; it serves two crucial purposes: increasing evidentiary ease for
proof of creation and subsequent infringement, and distinguishing

Id. at 306.
Wolfgang Iser, The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach, in READERRESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM CRITICISM 50, 54 (Jane P.
Tompkins ed., 1980) (“The fact that completely different readers can be differently affected by
the ‘reality’ of a particular text is ample evidence of the degree to which literary texts transform
reading into a creative process that is far above mere perception of what is written.”).
294 Hélène Cixous, The Character of “Character”, 5 NEW LITERARY HIST. 383, 385 (1974).
295 Id.
292
293
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federal copyright protection from state common law protection (the
latter extends to some unfixed works). 296
The evidentiary rationale for the fixation requirement is
paramount for characters. How can a subsequent author be sure to
avoid copying from an earlier author, given the independent lives
characters live, and the additional and multiple meanings characters
may accrue, in their post-textual instantiations? If Author 2 reads a
work by Author 1 and finds Author 1’s character, Jones, deeply
compelling, nothing in the law of copyright would stop him from
naming his own original character Jones. Borrowing a name is not, by
itself, infringing on an author’s copyright. 297 If Author 2 were to borrow
from Author 1 not simply the name, but many details from the text
including verbatim descriptions of the character, or many textual details
that embed the character, Author 2 would be infringing on the
copyright of Author 1. The question for independent copyright
protection lies at neither end of the spectrum, however. Somewhere in
the middle, Author 2, perhaps deeply influenced by Author 1’s work,
borrows something from Author 1’s character. Not enough to land him
at the end of the spectrum where he would be clearly infringing Author
1’s text. Yet he infuses into his borrowing of that character considerable
new life, and, more importantly, many more layers of interpretation that
bring that character to life outside the original text. To do so, he
proceeds from an amorphous view of that character, one that lives
outside the text and inside Author 2’s mind. Returning to the
evidentiary problem, it becomes clear how fixation plays an important
role by providing bright line rules about what counts as copyrightable
subject matter on its own, and when. Outside the text, in the minds of
their readers, characters should not be independently copyrightable
because, in a very real sense, they fail to satisfy copyright’s fixation
requirement once they have been removed from their texts.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTING LITERARY INSIGHTS
Recalibration of copyright protection for independent characters
could come in a number of forms, all of which could conceivably ease
the problems in copyright doctrine that literary considerations
highlight. Answers to copyright’s current confusion could address the
convergence of trademark and copyright; the implications of the
character entanglement and authorial style problem; the lack of medium
neutrality in copyright’s preference for the visual over the verbal; the
inconsistency bedeviling the threshold tests for character
296
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copyrightability; or the fixation dilemma raised by verbal characters
who require mental “completion” by readers. Correcting the doctrinal
mess in which character law finds itself could help to shape the
derivative work right, which is a subject ripe for copyright reform.
Though the foundation of this Article, and its evidentiary buttresses, are
plainly not meant to hold up an argument primarily about copyright
reform, some implications for reform do flow from using literary tools
and texts as the Article has argued, and these implications are worth
pursuing in future scholarship.
If copyright’s selection of characters is biased, and it rewards or
incentivizes certain kinds of characters over others, copyright could
theoretically be adjusted to try harder to be aesthetically neutral.
Alternatively, since aesthetic neutrality seems implausible, copyright law
could seek to be more explicit in its aesthetic biases. If it sought to
eliminate biases, it could evolve in the direction of greater inclusion or
exclusion of characters, in other words, by providing more or less
protection. If it sought simply to be more explicit in its aesthetic
proclivities and interpretive choices, copyright protection would more
likely contract. By forcing courts to bring aesthetic motives to the
surface, legal reasoning could give voice to factors that have in fact been
at play without courts’ saying so. This airing of the doctrinal laundry
would have salutary effects on the case law and could exert collateral
influence on the interrelated spheres of artistic production and the
public domain. It could help incent more authors to create works that
feature characters that are aesthetically variegated (rather than merely
flat), and it could free more downstream authors to use more
preexisting characters to create new works.
If the scope of copyright’s protection for independent characters is
unclear, it could be clarified in ways that understood characters broadly
or narrowly. But the broader the protection for the character (that is, the
more the character can conceivably comprise, and thus the more of its
surrounding work it can bootstrap for protection against subsequent
uses), the more confusing and inequitable the law will become.
Characters that comprise large amounts of the underlying work can
eventually be collapsed into the text, thus vitiating the utility of
protecting the independent character as such. This may cut in favor of
minimizing the scope of protection in characters.
Theoretically speaking, it is easy to suggest that copyright
protection expand or contract, but of course the mechanisms used to
achieve changes in scope are themselves not free from costs and
potential aesthetic externalities. That said, a number of possibilities
could be explored, either endogenous or exogenous to copyright law.
Exogenously, the selection problem might be addressed through
recourse to trademark law. If the distinctive delineation test remains in
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place, copyright law could look to trademark law, which after all, has
already internalized “distinctive” as a term of art, and has a set of
established tools and doctrines for identifying it. Pushing that idea
further, copyright law could insist that independent intellectual
property protection for characters should in fact be limited to trademark
law. Given that copyrightable works would still be protected under
copyright, this might represent more of a doctrinal clarification than a
practical one, but it could ease chilling effects around characters that are
not also trademark-protected.
Endogenously, another possible mechanism to explore is the
rehabilitation of the Sam Spade, “constitutes the story being told” test.
Though the test is much maligned, there are reasons for which it might
actually present a more workable, clearer, and more aesthetically explicit
standard for copyrightability, if courts are to continue to apply a
threshold copyrightability test at all in cases concerning independent
copyright in characters. It could be yoked to a kind of entanglement
analysis: if a character constitutes the story being told, perhaps it is no
longer separable from the work in which it stars. A character might
merit independent protection if he constitutes the story being told
because he is no longer merely a vehicle, or a functional aspect of the
work. Then perhaps the standard could be introduced at a second stage
of analysis as well: does the subsequent work’s allegedly infringing
character also constitute the (subsequent) story being told? If so, the use
might be subject to a more rigorous standard of substantial similarity
analysis, or a rebuttable presumption against it might arise, that fair use
analysis could address.
Normatively, the Article has made two overarching claims, the first
mainly methodological, and the second substantive. The first argues for
the value of an interdisciplinary approach to copyright law. Literature
can do much etiological work in diagnosing why copyright law is
muddling character jurisprudence. It also helps with the prognosis:
literary considerations predict continued confusion in the law unless the
underlying issues—such as character entanglement and hidden aesthetic
preferences—rise to the surface. The Article’s second contribution is
more clearly substantive, and it suggests why courts may be confused
and inconsistent about how to distinguish character from text in
determining the proper scope of independent character protection. It
also argues that the law of literary characters improperly contains
aesthetic preferences in terms of which characters it selects for
protection. Misunderstandings about characters contribute to the law’s
doctrinal inconsistency and confusion. Literature suggests that it can
make a case for its own value in the discussion of copyright law and
policy, and that what it has to say could play a small but important role
in copyright reform.

